

THE ISSUE OF TRUTH IN
THE THOUGHT OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

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By

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Abbreviations

- BT - Being and Time
- EGT - Early Greek Thinking
- EP - The End of Philosophy
- ET - "The Essence of Truth", in Existence and Being
- ID - Identity and Difference
- IM - An Introduction to Metaphysics
- N - Nietzsche (2 Bände)
- OWA - "The Origin of the Work of Art"
- QCT - The Question Concerning Technology
- PDT - Poetry, Language, Thought
- TB - On Time and being
- WICT - What is Called Thinking?
- WIT - What is a Thing?

INTRODUCTION

This paper undertakes an exploration of the issue of truth in Heidegger's writings, and specifically in terms of the continuation of Heidegger's stated project in Being and Time: to ask the question of the sense of being on the horizon of time.¹

Heidegger initially raises the issue of being and time, in the context of a questioning after the original, unified sense of being; whether a single determination of the sense of being is possible, how it could be attained.² The question is an ancient one, and from the first, points toward time as the standpoint from which being receives its determinations.³ The question of the sense of being has an historical development, and demands of the inquiry that it become historical.⁴

Time functions as an ontological criterion, differentiating realms of being into 'supra-temporal' and 'temporal',⁵ in terms of 'being and ... becoming, appearance, thinking, ought'.⁶ The sense of being has been determined through time unthinkingly, so that we do not question that we mean "presence" when we say "is".⁷

The sense of being which has dominated Western thinking was originally determined on the basis of a definite interpretation of time; namely, as the infinite, continuous, succession of "now"-moments. It was Aristotle who formulated the interpretation of time which has remained standard.⁸ For Aristotle, time is a series of transient "nows". Each "now" passes away, to be succeeded by another, identical "now", in infinite series. The 'flow' of time is thus uniform. Whatever is, is preeminently in this now, the present one, which, though continuously new, is yet always the same as the "now" which has just passed away. The "now" designates the present. Time is unidimensionally conceived from the horizon of the present.

"Presence" was thought to do justice to what is meant by "being", in ancient ontology, since it indicates the point at which everything which 'is' becomes actual - available to man.⁹ 'Was' and 'will be' indicate a deficiency since they are 'not-yet-now' or are 'no-longer-now'. Only the present represents the fullness of being in the ancient Greek view, for past and future 'are' not. Past and future lack 'presence', and, as such, were excluded from being. 'Is' expresses

the perfection of being, and 'is' bespeaks both that which now is here and that which eternally is, throughout each "now", free from change, divisibility and succession. The 'present', the 'now'-moment, which, for Plato and Aristotle, properly expressed the being of what is, presupposes an infinite 'now'-series. 'Being' was understood to be the everlasting present, thus, the perfection of presence was eternity in the 'classical' Greek world. Interpreting being unidimensionally from 'the present' excludes from being possibility, change, creativity. Even for Aristotle, change can only take place on the basis of something which remains everlastingly the same, that which "always has been".

Both time and eternity are understood on the basis of the 'now'. The 'now' of the temporally successive eternity is correlative to the sense of presence which fulfilled the Greek idea of being. Hence, even those beings which were considered to be 'outside' time, were indeed temporal, in the sense that they endured throughout time's passage. And since the 'now' is the exemplary meaning of time for the Greeks, time can function as a criterion for differentiating

realms of entities in traditional ontology,¹⁰ by distinguishing 'everlasting' from transient beings.

The interpretation of the sense of being as presence restricts being to the determination of the 'is' of actuality, of entities. Classical ontology was primarily entitative, or "ontic". The entitative 'is' of presence does not exhaust the sense of being: It may be possible, through renewed questioning of being "on the horizon of time", to restore to being creative possibility, and to maintain being's transcendence of beings.¹¹

In Being and Time, Heidegger elaborates the issue of the sense of being, in terms of the temporality of that entity which has, in its being, "an understanding of being" - Dasein.¹² This project is not completely successful in Being and Time, it will be shown, because the parameters of the analysis do not achieve the primordiality which Heidegger sought. In order to achieve the aim of the question of being, Heidegger further develops the fundamental insight that man is the site of disclosure of being. Now the question of the sense of being becomes explicitly the issue of how being discloses itself to man: truth.

There are some hints that this approach to the question has already begun in Being and Time, but we shall focus upon later writings which develop the issue of truth in its historical character.

Ontology, the question of the sense of being, discloses itself as the question of the truth of being, the way in which being historically becomes man. This is expressed in the phrase: "The truth of essence is the essence of truth".¹³ Through his interpretations of the early Greek thinkers Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Heidegger shows that being did not always have the sense of 'presence', but was originally understood as 'forth-coming of being into unconcealment'; presencing of what is present.¹⁴ Originally, being was understood in its difference from beings as the granting of the clearing into which man stands. But with the granting, being withdraws in favour of that which it has unconcealed, and in this, the epoche, Heidegger achieves the primordially he had sought for the project of questioning being.

That this experience of being declined into the entitative interpretation of being as 'presence', indicates a 'change in the truth of essence' (Wesen).¹⁵

Metaphysics appears with Plato, in the oblivion of the ontological difference and the division of presence - limited now to entities - into the two worlds of the chorismos: 'being and ...' its limitations; becoming, show, thinking, ought. Man is set adrift into errancy when he fails to recognize his essential belonging to the happening of being.

Metaphysics comes to its end with Nietzsche, who overturns Platonism while remaining himself within the metaphysical thinking of the chorismos.¹⁶ Nietzsche declares being empty, "... a vapour and a fallacy" - in the sense of perfect presence - and affirms instead the 'limitations'; above all, the 'ought'. He brings to the fore what had latently determined Western thinking from the time of Plato: evaluation, will. The conception of truth which has dominated the West since Plato, the correct correspondence of subject and object, is exposed by Nietzsche as relying upon perfect, continuous presence - hence, for him, illusion. The perspectival evaluation of will can, however, express itself in truth, according to Nietzsche, in works of art. Truth and art are a "raging discord". Through an examination of Heidegger's

approach to the relation of art and truth, we will show how they are intimately involved with each other in the ground from which they take their rise. Both 'correspondence' and 'presence' arise from a more primordial experience of being. Heidegger also amplifies the analysis of thinghood of things which he had made in Being and Time.

The phrase 'end of metaphysics' indicates that the metaphysical interpretation of being has exhausted itself, has exposed itself as empty and unproductive. It does not mean that metaphysics as a mode of unconcealment has ceased to prevail. Just the opposite: in modern technology, metaphysics reveals its essential trait of oblivion of being. Being, to which man always essentially belongs, prevails as 'empty' in technology, for everywhere beings take precedence, and man is provoked from the prevailing mode of unconcealment into bringing-forth being in manufacturing and production; but without any awareness of this.

Surpassing metaphysics, therefore, is in no sense a 'refutation' of metaphysical principles, but rather, a recognition of metaphysics as grounded in the oblivion of being, and at the same time, recollection

of being which turns away from forgetfulness.
Recollection of being brings man into his proper way-
to-be, so that he can restore being to its truth.

Recollection is at once historical, in that it returns to the original granting of being, through the de-construction of metaphysics, and at the same time, meditation on the enduring belonging-together of being and man: Ereignis.¹⁷ In conclusion, we shall discuss the Er-~~e~~ignis as the unifying sense of being, which Heidegger has sought all along, in which being and time are thought together.

Chapter One

TEMPORALITY AND TRUTH

The neglected question of the sense¹ of being forms the issue for the writing of Being and Time - and for Heidegger's subsequent writings. The question of the sense of being has always come to light on the horizon of time, though this preeminence of time in the question of being has remained unthought.²

Heidegger mentions the ontologically differentiating function which time has tacitly assumed in Western tradition, in the distinction of 'temporal' and 'non-temporal' entities, with its familiar contrast between the timelessness of propositions and the temporal manner of asserting them; and the dichotomy between entities 'in time', and what is 'beyond time'.³

Being has traditionally meant "presence", as interpretation of ancient ontology shows. The meaning intended by the Greeks in the words 'on' and 'ousia' was fulfilled by 'paron' and 'parousia' - presence.⁴ That which is, has been understood as that which is present; thus the very sense of being has been determined from time, and specifically, from the time-

dimension of the present - though this conception of time, and of being, rests upon foundations which remain unquestioned and inexplicit. The question of the sense of being will have an historical dimension, primarily as the dismantling of traditional interpretations, so as to arrive at a "primordial experience" of being.⁵

Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being. (BT, p.19)⁶

and time,

... needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of being, and in terms of temporality as the being of Dasein, which understands being. (BT, p.39)

The project of Being and Time is only partially fulfilled in that book, we shall maintain, because the way in which Heidegger had wanted to explore the issue of the sense of being - on the horizon of the unity of the three ekstases of Dasein's temporality - did not adequately explain how Dasein's understanding of being was related to the sense of being; how being itself is to be "made visible in its 'temporal' character."⁷

Being and Time represents only the first two parts of the projected First Division (Erstes Teil),

and was to have included a deconstruction of the history of ontology on the basis of 'temporality'. Missing from Part One (Erster Abschnitt) is "...the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of **Being**."⁸ These issues, it will emerge, are developed in Heidegger's later writings, but, significantly, not as guided by the problematic of temporality.

The First Part (Erster Abschnitt) of the published book, "the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein "⁹ sets out to describe the being of Dasein as the entity which is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological: Being is at stake for it. Dasein is the only being which is in such a way as to be disclosed to itself; it questions being because its being is in question.¹⁰

Dasein is, in its own being, concerned with being, but this is only possible because being is available to Dasein. However tacit, however vague, existence is always guided in advance by its primordial relation to being.¹¹ Dasein is the illuminated 'there' (Da) of being. In the First Division, (Erstes Teil), Heidegger begins with the fact that man's essence lies

in its ek-sistence, its 'standing-out' into the world. Dasein appears as the unitary phenomenon 'Being-in-the-world', the analysis of which forms his task there. Once this description arrives at temporality as the 'sense of the being of Dasein', the 'preparatory analytic' of being-in-the-world must be repeated on a higher and 'more genuinely ontological level', re-interpreting all its structures as modes of temporality. "Dasein and temporality" forms the Second Division (Zweite Abschnitt) of the First Part (Erstes Teil) of Being and Time.

The 'there' of being-there, the fact that man exists in such a way as to be its 'there', disclosed to itself and open to whatever is, gets interpreted ever more primordially in the course of Being and Time. 'Being-in-the-world' is the unitary, 'a priori' structure which provisionally exhibits the 'there' through analysis of its three terms: the worldhood of the world, 'who' is in the world (Dasein in its everydayness), and 'being-in as such'.¹²

'Worldhood' is the first of the items which constitute the ontological structure of being-in-the-world. Dasein's concerned dealings in the world

encounter for the most part utensils, entities lying ready-to-hand for Dasein's projects. Utensils never appear as singular, but always within the context of a totality of utensils, each referring to the others according to a structure of purposes established by Dasein. The world, as a constitutive component of Dasein, is that toward which Dasein projects itself, and from which it gives significance to itself, and to other beings. Thus the world enables things to be encountered and discovered in their being; utensils let the world, as the context of references, appear, when they fail in their readiness-to-hand, when they are missing, dysfunctional, or 'in the way' of concern. At such times, the ready-to-hand demands the attention of concern, and brings to the fore the presence-at-hand of the utensil; which can then be thematically interpreted. When the structure of assignments which determines the being of what is ready-to-hand is disturbed, then that context - the world - itself becomes visible. The referential character of the totality of involvements is one of significance, based on that which for Dasein is always at stake - its being-in-the-world.

For the most part, Dasein is absorbed in the

world of its concern, and this characterizes the 'who' of Dasein in its everydayness. Being-with is constitutive for being-in-the-world: "... because Dasein's being is being-with, its understanding of being already implies the understanding of Others."¹³ Everyday being-with-one-another reveals itself chiefly as the subjection of individual Dasein to others, who dispose over its possibilities of being. But the 'others' are no definite individuals; they are simply 'one' (das Man), the 'public', which prescribes how and what Dasein shall think, feel, and say. 'One's' way of being is a surrender of self to inauthenticity. If authenticity is to be achieved by Dasein, it must first collect itself out of dispersal into 'one', and self-interpretation in terms of 'one's' world, and discover itself through clearing away disguise and concealment.

Being-in-the-world is in every case its own 'there' (Da). Dasein is 'there' for itself and for other worldly entities by virtue of its open, and disclosive way-to-be. "Dasein is its disclosedness."¹⁴ This is what is intended when we employ the metaphor of the lumen naturale which guides man's 'inner sight'.

To say that it [Dasein] is 'illuminated'

("erleuchtet") means that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared (gelichtet) in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. (BT, p.171).

Dasein exists in such a way as to take over its cleared 'there' - or fail to do so: "... the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is to be its 'there'."¹⁵ Being-in is disclosive in disposition, understanding and speech.

Disposition is that type of primordial disclosure in which Dasein is brought before its being as thrown. It is shown to itself 'that it is and has to be' this being. Dasein is always somehow disposed, its 'there' is always disclosed to it somehow, since it has been delivered over to its being. Dispositions can let Dasein encounter the world, be affected by it, in such a way that Dasein evades its very self, in disintegration (Verfallenheit).¹⁶

Understanding is the second existential structure which constitutes the 'there' of being-in-the-world. The world is 'there' as that 'for-the-sake-of-which' Dasein is, and understanding is the disclosedness which reveals the 'there' in its 'for-the-sake-of'. Dasein's ability to choose itself, or to

miss itself, is the basis for understanding. Understanding is pervaded by the possibility of devoting itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world, and understanding itself in terms of 'one's' world; or of throwing itself into its 'for-the-sake-of' and existing as its self. Dasein is thus a possibility-to-be which has been delivered over to its 'there' in disposition; it is thrown possibility.¹⁷ Understanding has the existential structure of projection; the way in which Dasein discovers its being-possible and discloses its situation. In projecting its possibilities for being, some understanding of being has already been disclosed.

The projective character of understanding makes up Dasein's 'sight', which is not to be taken as mere visual seeing, but as Dasein's primordial disclosiveness.¹⁸ 'Sight' corresponds to the clearedness which characterizes the 'there'.

But genuine sight may be distorted into a mere everyday 'seeing' (curiosity).¹⁹ Dasein concerns itself with fleeing its being-in-the-world, and abandons itself to the world. It seeks to see only for the sake of seeing; looks for distractions from what is an issue

for it. Dasein views entities merely with regard to their outward 'look', and takes pure intuition (Anschauung) for the decisive experience of them. In curiosity, Dasein "never dwells anywhere", is uprooted from its essential concern, from its world, and from the genuine disclosiveness possible for its understanding.

Discourse, or speech, is the third constituent of 'being-in'. Speech articulates the intelligibility made evident through disposition, according to the significance disclosed in understanding. It is constituted by three items:²⁰ in discourse, being-with-others becomes explicitly shared. What is fundamentally expressed, or said in the talk, is the being-out, and -in-the-world constitutive of Dasein. Finally, speech shows what can be encountered in the world; it makes-known what disposition and understanding discover. Speech is rooted in Dasein's understanding intelligibility, as hearing.

Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost [possibility-for-being] - as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it [i.e., the call of conscience], Dasein hears, because it understands. (BT, p.206)²¹

The making-known which is constitutive for discourse may also be distorted into a closing of the 'there' and a covering-up of entities, in idle talk.²² Idle talk merely communicates 'being-with', rather than the primordial relation with what is to be shown through the discourse. One repeats and passes along what has been said, without ever appropriating beings primordially, making them one's own. But Dasein always first encounters the pre-interpreted everyday world of idle talk, before it ever dis-covers, re-interprets, or genuinely appropriates the world.

In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world-in-itself' so that it just intuits what it encounters.... The ['one'] prescribes one's state-of-mind [disposition], and determines what and how one 'sees'. (BT, p.213)²³

Everyday Dasein is absorbed in 'one', through idle talk, curiosity, and the ambiguity²⁴ of never being able to decide what is disclosed genuinely, and what is merely passed along. Disintegrative Dasein is in the public interpretation of things, yet it misses its genuine possibilities of being. As a thrown being-in-the-world, as always having been in a world which

has already been interpreted and covered-over, Dasein has always already fallen away from itself into the world which belongs constitutively to its being.

Anxiety discloses being-in-the-world as a phenomenon in its entirety, in its projective existentiality, in its thrown facticity, and in its disintegration. By taking his departure from a description of the phenomenon of anxiety, Heidegger will be able to grasp the wholeness which "primordially and constantly" characterizes Dasein, as care.

That about which one is anxious is the same as that in the face of which one has anxiety - being-in-the-world.²⁵ Anxiety is responsible for Dasein's fleeing from itself, toward entities in the world; its disintegration. Nothing is of avail in anxiety, neither beings, nor other Dasein. Anxiety manifests itself from no particular direction; one feels strange, 'not at home' in the everyday. Anxiety arises in the face of the 'nothing and nowhere' of Dasein's worldliness.²⁶ Thus, anxiety removes the possibility of understanding oneself in terms of 'one' and the world, and throws Dasein back on that about which it is anxious: its authentic possibility-for-being-in-the-world.²⁷

Only with the working-out of Dasein's authentic possibility-for-being does Heidegger arrive at the primordial articulation of Dasein's being - in temporality. In understanding, Dasein is self-projective towards its possibility, that for-the-sake-of-which it is. Dasein is always already ahead of itself. In disposition, Dasein is delivered over to itself as having already been thrown into a world. The essential, unitary structure of Dasein is characterized as being "ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world",²⁸ as having-been. 'Being-in-the-world' includes being-with others, encountering things, and thus the way Dasein, as disintegrating, is absorbed in the world of its concern.

At this point, when it would seem that the "preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein" is complete, and that the analysis of "Dasein and temporality" is about to unfold, Heidegger directs his attention to the problematic of being and truth (Sections 43 and 44). At the end of Section 44, he suggests that, in the phenomenon of care, we have arrived at "... the basis for conceptualizing the understanding of being ...; that is to say, it must be

possible to define the sense of being."²⁹ But the analysis of care has not yet been completed - we have digressed for two sections from the "analytic of Dasein" to the primary question of "fundamental ontology", at which the analytic was aiming.³⁰ "...with the help of what we have achieved, that which could be indicated crudely at the beginning of the existential analytic, must now be concentrated into a more penetrating understanding of the problem."³¹ Has the analysis become completely refined, when we are not yet cognizant of the temporal exposition of Dasein? Sections 43 and 44 could be set aside for the moment, so that the "existential conception" of care (ending on page 244) which is elaborated in the "primordial interpretation" of the being of Dasein (beginning on page 274), should be uninterrupted. We suggest that these two sections, which expressly approach the question of the sense of being, should fall, not between Divisions I and II (Ersten und Zweiten Teilen) of Being and Time, but between Divisions II and III (Zweiten und Dritten Teilen), where the exposition of "time and being" was to have been given.³²

Heidegger turns to the interpretation of

Dasein's utmost possibility in order to grasp Dasein in its totality. Death is, for every Dasein, the final possibility, in which its being-in-the-world is at stake; the possibility which permeated Dasein's existence from the beginning with finitude.³³

Disintegrating Dasein tries to forget its death, and to flee from it. Authentic Dasein, by contrast, recognizes death as its ownmost possibility, knows that its being is constituted by finitude, and so accepts its death, and becomes radically individualized as its authentic self. Dasein's possibility-to-be-its-self is attested by the voice of conscience,³⁴ which, as the call of care, makes it possible for Dasein to find itself from dispersion in 'one' and to choose itself. Conscience gives Dasein to understand the finitude which pervades its existence, the being-possible for which Dasein is responsible (guilt). It is a silent mode of discourse, which makes Dasein transparent to itself as its own self, claimed by its own death. To it, there corresponds hearing as wanting to have a conscience.

Authentic Dasein breaks away from disintegration in hearing the call and in resolutely getting ready for death.

This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards. (BT, p.372).

Being-towards-death, either as authentic preparatory resolve, or as inauthentic, is essentially futural. Authentic being-towards-death lets itself come towards itself out of the future. The future makes projective understanding possible.³⁵ Preparatory resolve takes over its owing;³⁶ it makes itself responsible for being the thrown basis of negativity. Only so far as Dasein is as having-been, is it able to come back towards itself from the future. Having-been which arises from the future makes disclosive disposition possible.³⁷ Finally, preparatory resolve discloses Dasein's situation and possibilities in the surroundings.³⁸ Temporality is the resolved coming back to itself to be a having-been, so that the future releases the present from itself.

This phenomenon [resolve] has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having-been; we designate it as "temporality". (BT, p.374).

Resolve is taken as a whole when it is grasped as temporality; thus temporality is the sense and unity of

care; it constitutes the ontological basis of Dasein's ek-sistentiality.

Dasein is a unified whole, which temporalizes itself in the three directions: the future, as coming back to itself; having-been, as that toward which Dasein comes; the present which is released from out of the future. Dasein stands out beyond itself, ek-sists, in three mutually involved, yet distinct ways, which Heidegger therefore calls the ek-stases of primordial time.³⁹ Temporality opens the 'there', thus constituting Dasein's disclosiveness.⁴⁰

Having shown that the being of Dasein is care, and that care, in turn, has the sense of temporality, Heidegger repeats the analysis of being-in-the-world, to interpret it in terms of temporality.⁴¹ The structural elements of care, Dasein's disclosiveness in disposition, understanding and speech, are shown in their temporalizing as the ekstases of 'having-been', 'future', and, in the case of discourse, temporalizing in all the ekstases. Heidegger further attempts to show how the modifiability of human temporality in authenticity and inauthenticity, differentiates among the possible modes of being described in Being and Time

- readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand and existence.⁴²

The analysis of temporality is completed with an interpretation of Dasein's being-towards its beginning; 'happening' (Geschehen; translated by Robinson and Macquarrie as "historizing").⁴³ Dasein stretches itself along between birth and death in such a way that it exists as born and as dying.⁴⁴ The past is not dead and 'passed'; rather, in authentic happening, man still carries it with him, alive with possibility, which he can recapture, claim as his own, or 'forget'.⁴⁵ As thrown, Dasein exists in a world, in a community, with others who share a common history (Geschichte). Dasein, in its historicity, temporalizes the history of the world, including beings ready-to-hand and present-at-hand.⁴⁶ Dasein always initially takes over the possibilities of the community into which it has been 'thrown'. But resolute recapture counters everyday interpretations in which Dasein finds itself.

Authentic happening is co-happening out of a future based on a shared having-been, which comes to a community as something destined (Geschick) from being. Hence, it is given to Dasein to stand open for the possibilities of 'its time', to take a resolute

stance toward the historical transmission of possibilities and to choose itself.⁴⁷

Heidegger's contention, that the determination of being as 'presence' arose out of the ordinary conception of time, can now be considered in light of Dasein's temporality.

The unity of ekstastic temporality in care clears the being of Dasein primordially so that it can exist disclosively. The genuine sense of the present is the presencing (Gegenwärtigen) as a momentous present (Augenblick) in which resolve reveals the situation of the 'there', so that Dasein can encounter what is in its surroundings and genuinely appropriate it.⁴⁸ Letting the ready-to-hand be involved, discovering it in its belonging to a world, is possible only by resolute taking-action which gives presence to beings appropriately.⁴⁹ If Dasein thus takes temporalizing upon itself, it exists authentically; if, on the other hand, it regards itself as something present-at-hand within a temporal infinity, then it exists inauthentically.⁵⁰ In this way, Dasein's temporalizing differentiates among modes of being.

Disintegration has its existential sense in the

present, whereas authenticity has its primary sense in the future.⁵¹ Inauthentic understanding - curiosity - does not tarry with what becomes present; it seeks merely to 'see' it. It is a making-present which makes-present for the sake of the present and attenuates the other ekstases which belong authentically to the momentous present. "The present leaps away from its authentic future and from its authentic having been,..."⁵² Heidegger characterizes inauthentic temporalizing as "the awaiting which retains", thereby expressing the way inauthenticity turns away from the future as coming towards, and forgets its having-been. Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concerns and understands itself in terms of a pre-interpreted, pre-articulated world.

Dasein temporalizes itself as being-in-the-world; in the disclosedness of the 'there', the world is always disclosed too. Grounded in the horizontal unity of temporality, the world has always already been disclosed so that beings can be encountered in Dasein's coming back from its temporal horizons. Dasein presupposes the world, 'retains' it, in all forms of concern and of objectification.⁵³

Disintegrating Dasein understands itself in terms of the objects of its concerns, and expresses itself temporally in terms of events in its surroundings.⁵⁴ 'Lasting for a span', events characterize the datability of the way Dasein mostly 'has' its time. The time thus interpreted is time for something; is either 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate for...'. Dasein is awaitingly absorbed in the objects of its concerns, forgets itself in not awaiting its coming back to itself from the future, and 'forgets' that it has 'allowed' itself time 'for...', so that time 'runs its course', 'gets used up'. As Dasein loses itself in the objects of concerns, it loses its time in them too. 'Now' belongs to the public being-together, because everyday concern understands itself in terms of the world, and 'uses' time, not as its own, but as time which 'is there' for 'one's' reckoning. Yet, as time 'for something', the 'now' has a structure of significance, pertaining to the worldhood of the world; it is "world-time" in that it expresses the purposefulness of Dasein's concerns.

Although "world-time" precedes any theoretical structure of a continuous stream of 'now-points',

nevertheless, the ordinary conception of time begins with everyday temporalizing, as Heidegger shows in his "existential-ontological interpretation" of Aristotle's definition of time.⁵⁵ Making-present temporalizes itself in an awaiting retention. The 'then' can be made present in the "now-no-longer"; the 'later' can be made present in the "now-not-yet". "This time is that which is counted and which shows itself when one follows the travelling pointer,..."⁵⁶ It shows itself as a continuous sequence of present-at-hand 'nows', in which neither the datability nor the significance of "world-time" are able to appear. Each 'now' differs from the others, in that it is newly coming along, yet every 'now', since it is now, is the same as all the others; "... it constantly has presence as something selfsame,... as this thing which changes, it simultaneously shows its own constant presence."⁵⁷ Thus the ordinary conception of time arises from the inauthentic temporality of Dasein, which looks away from its future and gets guided by the public 'one', which is indeed 'infinite', in the sense that it is not individual, and cannot die.

It is this conception of time which determines

being as continuous, permanent presence, and which has done so since Greek times.⁵⁸ The inauthentic present, the time 'in-which' entities appear and events occur, since it arises from Dasein's having forgotten itself, is normally taken to be 'eternal'. On this basis, beings are differentiated into 'supra-temporal' and 'temporal'; those which exhibit permanence, and those which can 'enter and leave' the continuous flow of time. But this time is derived from a more primordial temporalizing in which future and past play their unique roles. "Presence" is a derivative determination of the sense of being, whose origins have been covered over. It is "without moment", for inauthentic temporalizing is a derived, secondary mode of time, lacking the significance of everyday, "world-time", and the momentousness of authentic temporalizing. Moreover, 'presence' is an ontic understanding of being, based on the temporalizing which disperses Dasein among entities ready-to-hand.

The sense of the being of Dasein is temporality, as revealed by the existential analytic of Being and Time. But the purpose of this analytic was the working-out of the temporal character of the sense

of being,⁵⁹ a purpose never completely fulfilled in that book. Heidegger does not disclose the originary, unified sense of being beyond existence, readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. He does show, however, that the 'temporal character' of being will have to open into all three dimensions of temporalizing - not only the present - that original time cannot be derived from entities present-at-hand, nor does it necessitate a distinction between 'eternal' and 'transient'; that the sense of being cannot be derived from any particular entity, or realm of entities, as being transcends them all.

The programme of Being and Time proposes to show that if Dasein has a pre-ontological understanding of being, and that if temporality is the sense of the being of Dasein, then, whenever Dasein understands and tacitly interprets being, it does so from the standpoint of time.⁶⁰ Time is revealed as the horizon for all understanding of being, and this horizon is to be shown in terms of Dasein's temporality. The project remains incomplete: it does not clarify the relation of Dasein's understanding to the sense of being. If being and its determinations are to be interpreted from the

temporal 'there', how can Heidegger avoid making the sense of being dependent on and relative to Dasein's understanding? Being's "temporal character", its history, would be reduced to the changing determinations given it by historical Dasein. This is not at all the intention of the analysis of Dasein as the site of disclosure of Being, although such phrases as "a priori" and "transcendental" could suggest that 'being' was only a structure of Dasein. It is not until Heidegger develops an interpretation of truth as unconcealment which involves the epochè - the self-withholding of being (see below, Ch.2) - that he can illuminate the issue of how the temporal character of being is related to the sense of being or of how the temporality of Dasein is related to the 'temporal' character of being. Conceptualization in terms of 'transcendence' is inadequate to express the way in which man and being belong together, the way in which "Understanding of being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's being...."⁶¹ so that it is open to being.

Dasein is the site of the disclosure of being;
this is the context wherein further questioning may

reveal how the sense of being is disclosed to understanding Dasein in the unity of its ek-statical ek-sistence. "... being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities to whose being something like an understanding of being belongs."⁶² It is through the development of the issue of truth, as we shall argue, that Heidegger achieves the fulfillment of his questioning of being. This process begins in Being and Time. The examination of truth in Being and Time occupies a special place: it is the only section which is not "repeated" in the Second Division (Zweiten Teil) ; it 'interrupts' the analysis of care in a way not necessitated by the precepts of that analysis; and it is 'foreshadowed' throughout Being and Time as "the central problematic" without which the project of fundamental ontology could not be completed.⁶³

Heidegger had already recognized the crucial importance of the sense of truth in the question of being, and had perhaps even begun to develop it in ways which led to his later work. "Our investigation requires a new approach."⁶⁴ - starting from the conclusion of Being and Time, not from the preparatory analysis of Dasein (Division I - Erstes Teil). Let us

return now to Sections 43 and 44, to consider the direction they give to Heidegger's project, for,

In ontological problematics being and truth have, from time immemorial, been brought together if not entirely identified. This is evidence that there is a necessary connection between Being and understanding, even if it may perhaps be hidden in its primordial grounds. If we are to give an adequate preparation for the question of Being, the phenomenon of truth must be ontologically clarified. (BT, p.228).

Heidegger's description of Dasein as being-in-the-world stands in startling contrast to strong tendencies of Western thought. Being-there is being-in-the-world: this expresses the intimate involvement of Dasein with its world. Dasein is no worldless 'subject', over and against which there stand opposed 'objects'; instead Dasein exists in a context of significant relations among things, pursues its ends for the most part non-thematically, within an historically granted ontological framework - a given understanding of being. Dasein is not only the impersonal 'I' of unadulterated cognition; its world is coloured by its concern, most especially by its concern for being. Dasein discovers things for their relational context by referring them to its 'for-the-sake-of', to its purposes, and in this way brings them to light in the clearedness of the

'there'.

At this point, we can begin to recognize the nature of the challenge which Heidegger issues to traditional perspectives, since for him, truth emerges in the clearing of Dasein. But truth has long been thought to have its place in 'true' assertions, more precisely, in the correct correspondence of subject and object.⁶⁵ But can a subject ever 'produce' a relation of agreement with an object, or liken itself to objects? We would have to assume that the being of the subject is both able to be 'like' that of an object, yet, by virtue of this ability, radically unlike (indeed antithetical to) the being of objects. How, then, has being been understood?

Heidegger's answer, founded on the analysis of Dasein's temporality, is that being has traditionally been interpreted as presence-at-hand (existentia).⁶⁶ For Descartes, Heidegger argues, mathematical knowledge sets the standard by which we can judge whether being has been authentically grasped. "Such entities are those which always are what they are."⁶⁷ Thus, being resides in that which constantly remains; enduringly is. Descartes,

... prescribes for the world its 'real' being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of being whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated in its own right - an idea in which being is equated with constant presence-at-hand.⁶⁸

because he is guided by a definite

... ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand,...⁶⁹

Descartes takes over the interpretation of being prevalent since Plato, namely, "presence"; though that interpretation comes to him in other guise, through ousia and existentia, subsequent modifications (coverings). Deliberative making-present⁷⁰ brings what has been discovered in awaiting and retaining closer, in terms of a definite survey of the totality of involvements. Dasein interprets entities as something. In mathematical physics, for example, nature is itself 'mathematically' projected, so that understanding is guided in advance by presence-at-hand. This kind of projection objectifies entities so that they can be set up over against a pure discovering (intuition).

For Descartes, both subject and object are, in the last analysis, present-at-hand in their modes of

being,⁷¹ and the impossibility of relating them to each other becomes apparent.

For the ontological concept of the subject characterizes not the selfhood of the "I" qua self, but the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand. (BT,p.367).⁷²

Against this, Heidegger argues that it would never be possible for two present-at-hand entities to 'agree' with each other, for there would never be any means of relating them one to the other.⁷³ Yet somehow, a commercium 'between' subject and object is held to subsist - man's involvement with his world has already been presupposed in the theory of truth as the agreement of subject and object. For Heidegger, "Such an interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content if we were to say that Dasein is the being of this 'between'."⁷⁴ Dasein is always already in a world, it is being-in-the-world, and does not need subsequently to be re-connected as subject to object. Its being is constituted by its 'relation' to the world.

The world has been pre-interpreted for Dasein in terms of a definite understanding of being; and this

interpretation has covered over primordially disclosive being-in-the-world. Disintegrating Dasein takes its orientation for the interpretation primarily from the being of entities in the world. Curiosity distorts genuine understanding into a mere 'looking' or 'intuiting', and in this way, what is ready-to-hand gets removed from involvements and becomes merely present-at-hand. Theoretical behaviour is a mere looking without circumspection.

Agreement⁷⁵ is held to present entities just as they are. And it assumes that their way of being is constant, enduring presence-at-hand. 'Truth', according to the principle of correspondence, gives entities in their self-sameness; it is the undifferentiated identity of the thing. But "constant, enduring presence" tacitly interprets being on a temporal horizon. Knowledge too - the agreement of subject with object - is supposed to give things just as they are. The valid assertion is held to be universally and necessarily true. But it is finite, temporal Dasein who makes the assertions. The problem of establishing correspondence between subject and object has posed insurmountable difficulties for philosophy from Plato's

attempted reconciliation in terms of participation between the eternal and the transient worlds, to the modern postulation of intuition of objects.

What is this relationship of agreement, this commercium between subject and object? What kind of being belongs to it, if not the being-in-the-world constitutive of disclosure? For the relationship between two present-at-hand entities cannot be supposed to be likewise present-at-hand. Assertion maintains its ascendancy because it is, primordially, a pointing-out, a showing of entities.⁷⁶ Fundamentally, assertion is not correspondence as 'likening', or 'relating', but the disclosure of entities. Assertion is rooted in the disclosiveness of being-in-the-world as disposition, understanding, speech.

For Heidegger, however, speech is the articulation of intelligibility. It has three constitutive items: shared being-in-the-world, the communication of being-with others; what the talk is about - the discovering of entities; what is said in the talk - for the most part, being-in-the-world. In this way, the coherence of the world is maintained. Truth happens in speech, then, because it uncovers

being, lets it 'be seen', be involved in the context of significance, and maintains it there. Being-in-the-world is the foundation for truth.

How is it that assertion came to be the primary locus of truth? Is it because assertion as a derivative of speech, originates in the logos of Greek ontology? But how could it have happened that being and sense became separated and the relation between them forgotten? We must take notice here, that the question of the sense of truth has an historical dimension.

Disposition reveals Dasein as already-in a world; projective understanding shows it as existing toward future possibilities; speech articulates its being in a world with others. It is through the openness achieved in Dasein's being ahead-of-itself-already-in-a-world as-having-been that it is cleared and able to stand out toward being. Dasein may be said to be "in the truth", to stand in the clearing of being; "In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true'. Dasein is 'in the truth'."⁷⁷ But Dasein, as thrown and projective, disintegrates into the world of its

concerns, and becomes dominated by 'one'; its interpretations and its covering behaviour; idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. "In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that 'Dasein is in the truth' states equiprimordially that 'Dasein is in untruth'."⁷⁸ Dasein is finite and temporal, thus truth, as discoveredness, is only insofar as and so long as there is Dasein;⁷⁹ but Dasein is essentially limited, so that it never has access to anything like 'absolute', 'complete' truth. Truth pertains essentially to being-in-the-world.

Heidegger bases the analysis of truth upon the phenomenal ground of being-in-the-world, because Dasein already exists disclosively within a significant totality, involved with future possibilities before it makes assertions. The assertions of logic, however, fail to reveal the totality of significance, the world, in their adumbration of selfsameness. Logical assertion removes itself explicitly from the contextual surrounds, and insists upon the static present in the 'eternal' realm of the universal and necessary. Only in deception does Dasein's way-to-be as riddled with possibility become evident, for there we must

acknowledge that one 'may' become deceived; or that indeed, one has been deceived in the past. Far from being 'a-temporal', logic only succeeds in achieving the extended 'now' of inauthentic temporality.

In the course of our discussion of Being and Time, we have seen Heidegger challenge the very grounds of the philosophical tradition, primarily by confronting that theory of truth which is by now virtually axiomatic in our world - correspondence. By means of the re-interpretation of human being as being-in-the-world, truth has been 're-located', into the context of a temporally disclosed world, an already cleared and interpreted site. Dasein is constituted as disclosive in the interpenetrating modes of disposition, understanding and speech; it is never an impartial and impersonal 'observer'. As care, Dasein is irretrievably committed to being; it is that being for which its very being is at stake. And Dasein is ekstatically temporal: its being - hence all its modes of disclosiveness - is constituted by temporality. This means that Dasein cannot, in fact, make any non-temporal claims; even 'the eternal' must be defined as the indefinite extension of the inauthentic present

'now'. "Discourse in itself is temporal..."⁸⁰

For Heidegger, truth has being: not the presence-at-hand of a relation between two present-at-hand entities, as in the correspondence of subject and object, but the clearing of the site of disclosure.⁸¹ In this ontological understanding of truth, propositions are made possible by Dasein's being in the truth and in untruth, and not the reverse. Propositions must be defined in terms of the truth; not the truth in terms of propositions. For truth is not the static self-sameness of identity. The sense of truth itself has a history if logos has become assertion. "The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein's very understanding of being - that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle."⁸² Because truth belongs to being, it is important to question the being of truth.

Truth is not present-at-hand identity of present-at-hand beings. Heidegger rejects the traditional interpretation of being as pure presence-at-hand. The constant, enduring self-sameness of

presence which arises in inauthentic temporality, deprives being of its full time-dimensionality. Being in the sense of presence could not be possessed of creativity; hence it could not characterize everything of which we say "it is".⁸³ Instead, Heidegger develops the understanding of being as a movement of presencing whereby being comes to beings in the clearing. But with this, we have come full circle; Being and Time sets as its task a working-out of the question of the sense of being. The onto-logical question works itself out in relation to Dasein, because Dasein is the site of being's disclosure. If, indeed, logos is the showing of the being of things, then the question of the sense of being wants to ask: what is the truth of being. What is the truth of being?; what is the being of truth?

Chapter Two

ALETHEIA AND THE HAPPENING OF METAPHYSICS

Asking the question of the being of truth led us back to the question of the truth of being. Heidegger's development of this question led him to the conclusion that being has not always had the sense of "presence", just as truth did not always reside exclusively in assertion. The question of being and truth is historical.

In the Greek beginning, being and truth were thought in their intimate involvement: "... being [physis], showing, lets emerge from concealment [a-letheia].";¹ "... presencing [eon] brings unconcealment along with itself."²

The early Greeks understood being as the power, which, of itself, emerges, shows itself, and brings itself to stand in beings.³ But to the emerging, unconcealing, of being, there belongs withdrawing and concealing, for, as Heidegger reads the Anaximander fragment,⁴

... 'coming-to-be is' and '^apassing-away comes to be'... The coming forward into ... and the

departure to ... become present within unconcealment between what is concealed and what is unconcealed. (EGT, p.30).⁵

Being (eon) names the movement of coming to unconcealment and going into concealment; the presencing of what is present "... between what is concealed and what is unconcealed."

We need not consider what is concealed as absent in the sense of 'unavailable'; and Heidegger tells us that,

... what is at the present time present is not a slice of something sandwiched between two absences. (EGT, p.37).

What is unconcealed is not to be understood as present in the sense of "presence-at-hand".⁶ 'Being' names the movement of coming and going itself, and therefore, absence along with presence. Things "linger in the transition", in unconcealment, for a while. The field of unconcealment is constituted by the approach and withdrawal of what comes to presence.

Heidegger's discussion of presencing in unconcealment takes its initiative from the passage in the Iliad in which Achilles addresses the seer Kalchas.⁷ The seer is capable of true seeing, because

he is one who has already seen. Having already seen, the seer can see into the future. His sight is guided in advance by "... what comes to presence in unconcealment."⁸

Such a seeing is momentous; it belongs to what Heidegger called "authentic temporalizing" in Being and Time.⁹ What becomes present is that which is in being; the being that has been; the being that will be. "... what is at the present time present is not a slice of something sandwiched between two absences."¹⁰ - the 'no-longer' and the 'not-yet'. That which is in being is not present-at-hand in the continuous flow of 'nows'. Rather, the 'present' involves what has been and what may come; it involves 'absence'.¹¹ The "gegen-" in Gegenwart ('the present'),¹² indicates for Heidegger the being-in and -with of worldly involvements, rather than the 'standing-opposed-to' of objectification. Along with the arrival in unconcealment of what is offered for the present, there comes what is absent, as a self-withholding offering. What has been and what is to come, come to presence together with what arrives in unconcealment; they are 'present by their absence'.

... it is precisely the presently present and the unconcealment that rules in it that pervade the essence of what is absent, as that which is not presently present. (AF, p.35).

The order of unconcealment - that which guides unconcealment - also rules what remains concealed. Therefore the seer can see what is absent along with what is present; the way in which absence is conjoined with presence.¹³ The seer is 'outstanding' in this ability; he stands beyond himself (ek-static); 'away' from the merely present-at-hand, toward what is absent; pre-eminently, the arriving and unconcealing movement itself.¹⁴

All things present and absent are gathered and preserved in one presencing for the seer. (EGT, p.36).

'Was', (German, 'war') involves "protection";¹⁵ whoever sees presence and absence together safeguards what arrives in unconcealment from forgottenness and keeps it in its possibility. Absence, as well as what is presently present, is let into the context of significant involvements, becomes part of the 'momentous present'. Truth for the seer is not the undifferentiated self-sameness of correspondence; it is

constituted by the movement of presencing, which, of itself, unfolds into unconcealment. Keeping absence together with presence maintains the two-fold of being (eon) and beings (eonta) which governs transitional presencing. For unconcealment occurs in the openness of Da-sein:¹⁶

Man is that present being which, illuminating, apprehending, and thus gathering, lets what is present as such become present in unconcealment. (EGT, p.38).

Having-seen, according to the manner in which presencing shows itself, enables the seer to see ahead,¹⁷ to envision significant belonging-together of things. 'Knowing',¹⁸ is founded on this primordial seeing - which is not to be confused with optical sensing, or with the thematized projection of understanding ('intuition').¹⁹ Seeing is, in the first place, guided by the order of presencing, and moreover, attends every sort of sensing. "Presence within the [clearing] articulates all the human senses."²⁰ Knowledge, having been guided by presencing, is able to see toward what comes into unconcealment:

Knowledge embraces vision and remains indebted to presencing. Knowledge is remembrance of Being. (EGT, p.36).

Remembrance (mnemosune)²¹ gathers into presence what is as absent and lets it belong appropriately to unconcealment. Techné²² is the knowledge which orders the emergent power of being, bringing it to stand – in a work of art, for example. Knowing, involving memory and seeing, informs Dasein's creativity.

Being, in the Greek beginning, meant self-illuminating emerging, and, concomittantly, self-concealing withdrawing. 'Presencing' names the unifying ordering of arrival and departure of whatever is which grants the horizon of appearance. Not the lingering, the 'before' and 'after', but the 'coming and going', the gathering together of present and absent constitutes the temporal horizon.

Heidegger's analysis of Anaximander's fragment determines that being of beings is named in the word chreon.²³ Whatever is present comes to presence in accordance with chreon, the two-fold of being and beings. Chreon, as Heidegger understands it, is most properly translated according to its etymological

kinship with "hand", expressing the involvement with something, which hands over, and yet keeps and preserves what is handed over. As expressing the manner in which being comes to presence, it is translated 'need' (Brauch).²⁴

How does being 'need' or avail itself of whatever becomes present in the expanse of unconcealment? Being enjoins entities to keep to their transitional 'while', by overcoming their tendency to detach themselves from their movement of approach and withdrawal and surmounting their leaning toward continuance and persistence - 'presence-at-hand'.

Whatever is presently present is not a slice of something shoved in between what is not presently present; it is present insofar as it lets itself belong to the non-present!., - they, these same beings, let order belong (by the surmounting) of disorder. (EGT, p.44).²⁵

Dike means "order", but also "considerateness", "care", or "reck" (the word from which "reckless" is derived).²⁶ Entities 'reck' among themselves by surmounting disorder, i.e., by becoming present to every other entity. Need delivers entities over to presence and lets them belong to unconcealment in a two-fold way: it lets entities belong together, in

mutual 'recking'; and it lets them belong to ordering itself.²⁷ Need sends each being into its appropriate context, so that it is in its proper way-to-be.

Therefore, whatever lingers awhile in presence can only come to presence when it lets order and thereby also reck belong; with respect to [need].... [Need] is the enjoining and preserving gathering of what is present in its presencing, a presencing which lingers awhile according to each particular case. (EGT, p.54).²⁸

In gazing not at the entities, but 'away', toward the field of unconcealment itself, the order of unconcealment - Brauch - which allots, or gives everything into its own becomes accessible.

Unconcealment, the emerging into presence and showing of whatever is present, gets guided 'in advance' by enjoining, ordering need. Not the things, not man himself, but the ordering of 'coming and going', constitutes the field of unconcealment. The clearing is ruled by a prevailing order, or modality, to which beings belong, and according to which they belong with each other. It is Dasein, which responds to the order of unconcealment, lets entities become present and belong appropriately to a context of involvements. Presencing draws human being into its

movement. As it comes forward, beings stand in the light cast upon them by being. But the clearing would not illuminate if man did not stand out toward unconcealment.²⁹ Man can gather and shelter what is made present because he is himself collected toward the presencing move of being. Man is committed in his essence as open, into the unconcealing forth-coming of presence. In its being, Dasein is concerned with being.

"As it reveals itself in beings, being withdraws."³⁰ As beings become present in the clearing, being tends to become 'hidden behind' them. The movement of presencing goes unmarked in favour of the entities. The self-illuminating of being - a-letheia - remains itself undisclosed behind the beings which come forward into unconcealment. This self-withdrawal of being in its presencing movement, constitutes the field of unconcealment. Unconcealment is ever only partial. "Truth is untruth." To those for whom what is presently present is "sandwiched between two absences" - to everyday Dasein, as it is described in Being and Time, it will appear that absence is 'excluded' from being, and that persistence is the primary trait of what is present. For entities tend away from the order of the

while, in prolonging their stay and in enduring. But for the seer, and for Anaximander, as Heidegger interprets them, the field of unconcealment is constituted by a different kind of temporality, corresponding to the authentic temporality of Being and Time. The seer can gather all things present and absent in one presencing, because he is aware of the unconcealing, and of the presence of what is absent as absent. Presence belongs to the gathering together of what is presently present and of what is absent; it is permeated by the movement of arrival and departure. Rather than 'before' and 'after', the seer dwells in the unified presencing of presence and absence through the twofold of being and beings.

Because being withdraws itself from that which it unconceals, it may leave human beings in forgetfulness of presencing; of collecting collectedness; of need.³¹ The self-withdrawal of being from the forthcoming of presencing, Heidegger names the epoche ("suspension") of being.³² The epoche sets beings and man into a modality of presencing in which history can come to pass, by committing (schicken) everything into its own way-to-be (Geschick; destiny).

The world is such an ordered field of unconcealment.³³
The becoming and prevailing of world is the authentic happening of history (Geschichte). Being needs presencing of beings to constitute the field of unconcealment. Does being need the essence of man?

Heraclitus speaks of the collecting collectedness, the unifying movement of presencing in Logos.³⁴ According to Heraclitus, humans can participate in the collecting only by homologeîn; the speaking in accordance with collected presencing.³⁵ Speech (legeîn) arises primordially from the letting-lie-together-before which heeds and protects that which already has been laid down before.³⁶ Legeîn lets what lies-together-before us into its safeguarding, by securing it in unconcealment and maintaining it in its collectedness. Letting what-is be in unconcealment, legeîn lets entities belong to being in their own way, showing them in their ontological depth, and letting being shine forth through them.

Thus speech is primarily a response to³⁷ presencing into unconcealment. Proper speech is hearkening attunement to that which comes to presence in unconcealment, including what presences as absent.

Gathered letting-lie-before is thus, in a sense, 'the same' as that which has already been laid before in the collected Laying (Logos). But speech, as the possibility of articulating the world of involvements, is, in another sense, not the same as the Laying-before into presencing;³⁸ it can also conceal what comes to presence. Homologeîn is the letting-lie-before of what does lie gathered before us; laying one as the same. Man needs something to which he can respond; being needs man in presencing.³⁹

Through the gathering (legeîn) turning to being, a turning-away from dispersion into the persistence of the presently present is accomplished.⁴⁰ Resolute existence turns from immersion in entities - disintegration - toward being's openness. Resolve lets-be in the sense of gathering protection of whatever has been laid down before. It is recollecting, since it is called to respond to the collected Laying (Logos). It lets lie before together (homologeîn) beings in their being. Resolve is recalled from dispersion into the world of its concerns, and forgetfulness, to its involvement with being. Man, in his struggle within and for being, may will-to-know,⁴¹ i.e., resolve to enter

the clearing and to endure in that stand. This decision releases ek-sistence from its everyday absorption with what is presently present - beings - to enter into its own, proper way-to-be. Turning away from everydayness is at the same time turning toward being.

Parmenides, too, speaks of legein.⁴² In Heidegger's treatment, Heraclitus and Parmenides are not considered 'opposed' thinkers; the one of constant flux, the other of static immobility. Rather, they say the same, for both think being as what is essentially gathered together in itself.⁴³

Needful is the gathered setting-forth as well as the apprehension of this: entities (in their) being. (IM, p.169).

Noein, gathering apprehension, takes its essence for legein, for Parmenides mentions legein before noein in Fragment 6. Thinking belongs to being and participates in its power.⁴⁴ For Parmenides, thinking and being are the 'same'; not in the sense of indifferent identity, but "in a striving sense",⁴⁵ for thinking is questioning, confronting, decisive. Noein apprehends that which a prior legein, letting-lie-before, has

already collected. Thus noein takes heed of what is already gathered to the unified movement of presencing. Noein is grounded in, and comes to presence from legein; it completes the gathering of legein, and thus it is essentially something said or uttered (phasis).⁴⁶ Noein is claimed by the unfolding of the two-fold of being and beings and thus participates in disclosive presencing.⁴⁷ "... apprehension is the happening that has man."⁴⁸ The essence of human being is determined by the striving belonging-together of apprehension and being.⁴⁹ Man needs to undertake the unconcealing gathering of noein and legein. Apprehension happens for the sake of being. At the same time, the disclosive unfolding of the two-fold needs the response of Dasein.⁵⁰

Presencing occurs in the gathering of what has been laid before into the illumination of what comes into unconcealment. The gathering together of presencing into one, names the way in which the mortal responds to presencing as "homologein": saying the same. "Same" because the way-to-be of man is engaged by being, so that he participates in unified unconcealing. Man's gathering and protecting of what becomes present names the way in which he is placed in

aletheia, the open region of unconcealment, the Da of Dasein. Man stands out ekstatically into the clearing, and is brought into his essentially temporal way-to-be in the presencing of being.⁵¹ Man stands in the transition of approaching and departing of beings. While he speaks of the way in which beings belong to the collecting collectedness of being, are 'one' with being, still, he stands in the two-fold of being and beings, open to the forth-coming of presence.

In his exploration of early Greek thinking, Heidegger's thought about being has deepened and broadened. The metaphysical vocabulary of Being and Time (e.g., "transcendental", "a priori", "structural", "existentialia") has disappeared. We find here a greatly enhanced appreciation of Dasein's "understanding of being"; Heidegger no longer confines the determination of Dasein's being to structural existentialia,⁵² but considers explicitly the way in which being becomes man as he is open and responsive to being. As the site of disclosure of being - in both senses of the genitive - Dasein's understanding of being remains the locus of questioning regarding the sense or truth of being, and of the essence of man.

There is no longer any suggestion that the sense of being might be dependent upon Dasein's interpretations; through his insight into the epochal character of presencing - the granting and withdrawal - Heidegger affirms the paramountcy of being.

Once truth meant the unconcealing, self-illuminating of presencing. Now it means conformity of judgment to its object in assertion (logos). Being and its sense became separated. Habitually, we think of being by contrast to something 'other', principally: 'being and becoming', 'being and show', 'being and thinking', 'being and the ought'. The 'other' is in each case something from which being is to be distinguished; but which nevertheless belongs 'somehow' to it. Do we similarly separate being from its sense when we say "being and time"?

Only because physis bears within it the traits of emerging and showing, of coming forward and bringing itself to stand, could it have eventuated these separations. Only because being makes itself available in show can the show degenerate to semblance! The possibility of unconcealment is at the same time the possibility of covering. Becoming and showing were

closely related.⁵³ Since anything which becomes presents us with a changing aspect which is 'no-longer-so' and 'not-yet-otherwise', it is permeated with non-being. As we have seen, the early Greeks understood being as permeated by flux: the unified movement of presencing, of 'coming and going', of presence and absence, comprised their experience of being. Becoming is showing of being. And show is a becoming of being, since it provides disclosure. Aletheia lies at the heart of the modern distinctions.

The distinction of 'being and thinking',⁵⁴ is crucial because it is determinative for the history of Western thought. This distinction is not situated in and among the other differentiations, since it represents them all. It has become the authoritative power, the foundation for all interpretation of being. We have come to understand thinking in terms of the "science of thinking" - logic⁵⁵ - whose rules and forms remain 'untainted' by historical change, hence secure and reliable. But 'logic' means epistèmè logikè, the science of the logos, which has traditionally meant, of statement. If logic is the science of statement, how can it lay claim to be the exposition of thinking?

Logic cannot explain the differentiation of thinking from being; rather, it is itself in need of a ground. Originally, thinking was determined from out of aletheia and physis. Being gathers man in his essence as standing open to being, as belonging-together with being and happening with it: Being as unconcealment is precisely what has been lost by logic.

The understanding of being declined from the first experiences of the early Greeks into a ground for the limitations (becoming, show, thinking, ought), essentially through the oblivion of aletheia in its original sense as the gathering unconcealing, prevailing throughout presencing. But these limitations are precisely the ways in which we understand being habitually and which delimit "presence-at-hand" in Being and Time. They show that the horizon for our understanding of the sense of being - the 'is' - delimits the "... sphere of actuality and presence, of permanence and duration, of abiding and occurrence."⁵⁶ With the analysis of the source of 'being and...' its limitations, Heidegger provides everydayness with its history, through de-construction of the layers of cover sedimented upon "original experience"⁵⁷ of being in

early Greece.

Physis as showing had originally two aspects: it can mean emergence, "... which gathers itself, brings-itself-to-stand in its togetherness and so stands."⁵⁸ Show can also mean the regard which an already present entity offers to view. With Plato, the outward 'look' (idea)⁵⁹ makes the thing. One aspect of being - showing - overshadowed the full disclosure of being. Physis is the emerging power, the stability which stands-there-in-itself. Idea, the 'look', determines the stable only insofar as it is something visible; its emergent presence has been forgotten.

In this determination, the essence of aletheia has already been lost. Aletheia no longer belongs to presencing as self-illuminating - now it is only 'the look' wherein something affords itself to us as present. But if that is true, man and being no longer belong-together in unconcealment. They have been 'separated', since the movement of presencing, as that which permits all show, has been hidden.

The 'look' is what something offers, presents to us, hence that through which it is present. Since

'presence' is the sense of being for the Greeks, that through which something is present is taken to be the being of the thing. The 'look' (idea), in which something places itself and so stands before us, is the stability of self-sufficient emergence; physis. Stability is what is opposed to the unstable aspect in the being-becoming differentiation.

The early Greek experience of mutability⁶⁰ - the movement of presencing into unconcealment - has been transformed. Being means the stability of the aspect presented by whatever is presently present. The field of presence is for Plato no longer the realm of unified presencing; it becomes, rather, a hierarchy of fields. Flux, on the lowest level, is merely the unstable, impermanent, inadequate representation of the permanent perfection of the ideas on the highest level. In the exaltation of being as idea, a chorismos (cleft)⁶¹ between the paradeigmatic, archetypal and ideal and the inadequate copy, (me on), the 'mere appearance', is opened. It is in the stable aspect - as opposed to the unstable, 'becoming' - the aspect of 'standing-there', that presence lies, as what is apprehensible. The field of presence had been, for

Anaximander, constituted by the arrival into and departure from unconcealment of beings. For Plato, however, it is man who ascends toward the most unconcealed field. In his upward movement toward the completely unconcealed, however, man 'determines' presencing, in the sense that being is that which he renders present through his apprehension.

Stability, the apprehensible aspect of presence, "... is the accessible presence of the present: ousia."⁶² Ousia is the source of the later distinction between essentia and existentia⁶³ as it can mean both the presence of something present, and this present thing in the 'what' of its appearance. In the show, an entity firstly stands-out-of-unconcealment; and secondly, asserts itself as something, that which stands.⁶⁴

What an [entity] is lies in its show, but the show presents (makes present) the what. (IM, p.181).

Idea is constitutive of the entity, idea which is only a remnant of the former power of physis, "a consequence" of the experience of physis as emerging show (Scheinen), "... exalted to the level of the

essence itself and taking the place of the essence."⁶⁵

'Whatness', quiddity, was distinguished from 'thatness', quoddity, as these arose in the transformation of physis into idea. Consequently, 'whatness' became the ideal, the most 'beingful' aspect of entities (ontos on). From the perspective of the Platonic chorismos, the permanent, enduring and genuine (being), is infinitely removed from the changing, transient and illusory 'world of show',⁶⁶ (me on). Since the unity in which being had previously been thought now lay hidden, the sense of being underwent a transformation. Being no longer belongs with man in the unconcealing gathering. Instead, unity pertains to being insofar as being is the 'always remaining' for man's calculations. Being is understood as 'permanent presence', that which constantly endures in self-sameness, and is thus ever available to man.

If the idea is ideal being, then 'truth' must be accommodated to it (homoiosis and mimesis).⁶⁷ Unconcealment becomes the correctness of vision regarding being. It implies apprehension as representation; rendering present (vor-stellen) over and over again in correct judgments.⁶⁸ Noein,

apprehension,⁶⁹ is appropriated by statement. Apprehension determines something as something; it renders something present in its present aspect. In so doing it becomes discursive thinking-through (dianoëin), and eventually, evaluating representation. Gradually it is defined in terms of ratio. The authority of statement as a court of judgment over being, goes so far as to determine being's possibilities, for if one statement should stand against another in contradiction (antiphrasis, 'against the speech'), that which contradicts cannot be.⁷⁰

Logos came to determine speech because it is the gathering disclosure of entities. But precisely as it is disclosive, speech can also cover and distort.⁷¹ In the repetition and passing along of what has once been revealed through speech, truth may become hearsay - heard and said superficially, without original experience ("idle talk"). In this way, Logos draws attention as the arena of decision against hearsay and distortion, for unconcealment, and an essential transition is effected: Logos is concentrated into 'statement' and becomes the vehicle for truth as correctness.⁷² Statement can be adjudged correct, if it

corresponds to, 'follows the direction of' the entity.

Initially the logos as gathering is the event of unconcealment, grounded in unconcealment and serving it. (IM, p.186).

Now truth becomes a property of statement, and is itself essentially transformed. Logos, which had earlier participated in the happening of unconcealment, is now severed from it, to the extent that truth is 'ascertained' through logos. Now logos is "to say something about something", and this 'something' underlies the statement, as something ready-made (hypokeimenon).⁷³ It is the 'subject' of the statement.

Being gets understood as the 'underlying' (hypokeimenon; later, 'substance'), determined by statement. Statement may represent it in diverse senses; these determinations are termed "kategoriai", categories, and ontology becomes a theory of statements about being, a doctrine of categories.⁷⁴ but logos as statement was already something available, easily manipulable for the purpose of forging correct (i.e., 'truthful') correspondence. Logic is born in the teaching and spreading of rules for correctness, when

original disclosure of entities no longer happens.⁷⁵ The belonging-together of man and being originally expressed in the words "legein" and 'noein' collapses. Unity is instead thought as the property of being which, as the 'underlying', is already available, offers itself as the unified 'subject' for statement, and 'object' for representation. The separation of logos from physis thus brings about a transformation in the way human being is understood, for it can no longer be thought from out of the unifying gathering. With this, man becomes the pivot around which ontological theorizing turns.

Unconcealment is always attended by distortion (pseudos), insistence on views. The continual struggle for aletheia became the struggle directed against distortion and perversion.⁷⁶ As such, it became a battle for the undistorted and unpervorted (a-pseudes).

Aletheia could not remain untouched when it was brought into this conflict - it became dependent upon its opponent. For the undistorted is certain of attainment only if apprehension is properly directed toward entities; but this means directed, and 'righted',⁷⁷ by them. Truth as correctness is derived

from the struggle against semblance.

The Platonic realms of reality were thus diversified and systematized according to the importance assigned them by man. For the permanent provides man with a lasting, fixed, available world which guarantees his judgments. Heidegger describes truth (aletheia) as the "... sustaining and governing ground ..."⁷⁸ of the essence of physis and logos, for they are gathered and held together in the relation of emerging-into-unconcealment. We have seen that in each feature of the decline or disintegration, a fundamental transmutation of the essence of truth has occurred. The change in physis to idea and logos to statement, rests upon the transformation, ^{and} the sense of being in the Greek beginning loses its centre. Being can no longer mean "presencing"; for presencing comes to pass in unconcealment. Instead, presence as idea provides the model for truth as correctness.⁷⁹ Liberation from the cave and upward progress toward the completely unconcealed, is a process of changing standards, by which things may be judged. Truth as unconcealment has become a fixed, regulatory standard both for apprehension and for life.

The achievements of early Greek thinking were re-organized around the central concept ousia.⁸⁰ Ousia⁸¹ is the name for being in the sense of permanent presence, already-thereness, availability. Hence it denotes 'what always has been', aei on. With regard to emergence, physis, what has always already been there is the earlier (proteron), the a priori. In this way, the priority of the past, "having-been-ness", in metaphysics gets established. Just as anamnesis refers to a prior kinship with what we can know - 'all thinking is recollection' - so, in all logos, statement, ousia signifies that which, underlying, lies-before; the hypokeimenon. As the subject-matter of what is said, hypokeimenon later becomes 'substance', in the Latin translation. And in all comprehending and 'making', we are referred back to the idea (as an aspect of ousia; eidos), the permanently present.

Ousia became definitive for Western philosophy through the Latin translation as substantia and thus for the retroactive interpretation of early Greek thinking,⁸² so that the original sense of the Greek words becomes covered up. We are now in a position to recount how the limitations are conceived in relation

to ousia (idea).⁸³ As opposed to becoming, 'being' is now eternal permanence; as opposed to 'mere appearance', being is that through which presence is always available. Fundamentally, however, both being and its limitations have already been defined by logos as statement and discursive thinking-through (dianoein). For evaluating representation, something permanent and always identical is necessary. Hence becoming appears as the impermanent, and mere appearance is shown to be incorrect and falsifying.

Permanence is the constantly remaining identity of something with itself which endures in this unity. As a result of the change in the essence of truth, and with it, the separation of physis and logos, identity and permanence emerge as essential determinations of 'presence'. Fundamental to the transformations of the traits of being in the decline is the oblivion of the gathering and, at the same time, the assignment of indifferent identity as the dominant characteristic of being.⁸⁴ Now apprehension begins to set itself apart from, and even to exercise authority over, being.⁸⁵ Thought becomes determinately the idea of something; rendering it present as re-presentation. It functions

to demonstrate something other than itself, and in its esteeming of what is correct and good, claims truth as a property of its own.

The limitations; 'becoming', 'show', 'thinking', 'ought', though they are delimited over and against being, must belong to being in some manner. They arise out of the way in which being is initially understood. The presencing of what is present involves unconcealment, speech and apprehension within itself; their gathering takes place in the difference of being and beings. But with the oblivion of the gathering, that which is held together within it becomes separated - the limitations take their rise. The limitations cannot belong to being if being is taken in the sense of idea and ousia - permanent presence.

... the sense of being that has been accepted up until now does not suffice to name everything that "is". (IM,p.204).

because it cannot include the ontological powers which circumscribe and delimit 'being'.

The transformation of presencing, its decline into 'presence', Heidegger calls the happening of metaphysics.⁸⁶ It is this which historically determines

the everyday understanding of being as Heidegger describes it in Being and Time. The meaning of 'the present' has changed. It can no longer mean the openness of unconcealment; now it is determined as the measure of motion in an infinite series of 'now-moments'. With the change in the essence of truth, a 'derivative' form of time becomes determinative for being. Perfect presence is eternal, that is to say, permanently self-same, in the sense of uniform, indifferent, and static identity. Thus the time through which being is understood offers itself as a kind of presence - that which always remains in the course of its passing away. The original sense of unity, the gathering into unconcealment, lies forgotten. Heidegger no longer interprets "presence" only as the inauthentic mode of Dasein's temporalizing;⁸⁷ it is privation of the full sense of being, originating within being itself, in the withdrawing epoche. This truncated sense of being has dominated Western thinking in oblivion since Plato.

The essence of man had been understood from out of the essence of being by the early Greek thinkers. The separation of physis from logos, however, alienates

human being from his way-to-be. At the same time, man is taken as the central orientation in all thinking about being. Metaphysics is 'anthropological'. Thinking is fundamental in its separation from being because it establishes being and what is opposed to being. The determinate sense of being which guides all our understanding and behaviour is that of idea and ousia; the permanent presence of what is identical with itself. The 'is' of statement assumed its decisive determination of the sense of being when physis was transformed through idea into ousia.⁸⁸ The 'is' was thought to do justice to the sense of being precisely because it expressed the permanence and self-identity of presence in serial time. It expresses being in ontic terms, since the 'is' can only refer to entities. In 'presence', the difference of being and beings, gathering into unconcealment, is completely obscured.

The change in the essence of truth from unconcealment to correctness comes about in oblivion of the original sense of gathering unity. Oblivion of the gathering brings about the separation of physis and logos, hence forgetfulness of the proper belonging-together of being and man. Throughout this oblivion,

man's determinations prevail - in the limitations. Metaphysics unfolds in the Platonic chorismos between 'being and ...' its limitations. The task, then, is to re-enact the beginning, for nothing less than the human being in his way-to-be is at stake.⁸⁹ For Heidegger this means understanding human being-there as the site of openness for disclosure of being.

The original perspective which Heidegger believes will disclose being more fundamentally, and in this way re-enact the beginning, is that of being and time. Time was,

... in the beginning of Western philosophy the perspective governing the disclosure of being,, though this perspective as such remained hidden - and inevitably so. (IM, p.205).

Here the 'and' of 'being and time'⁹⁰ is not a constriction and delimitation of being, as it has formerly been thought in the differentiations 'being and becoming', 'being and show', 'being and thinking', 'being and the ought'; it is, rather, the site in which the unconcealment of being unfolds. And that site is historical, for there has been a change in the being of truth, from 'unconcealment' to 'correspondence'. 'Unconcealment' (aletheia) indicates presencing as

self-illuminating. But with the change in the being of truth, there has come about a change in the truth of being, as presencing has come to mean permanent, perfect presence. The historical character of unconcealing presencing might be concentrated in the phrase, 'the truth of being is the being of truth'.

Chapter Three

OBLIVION OF BEING

Experience of being in the Greek beginning took place in the context of the difference of being and beings, but without ever explicitly considering that difference.¹ Yet the difference informed the thought of Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, however tacitly, for they named the gathering movement of presencing Chreon, Logos, Hen. That presencing orders unconcealment in a definite way, so that human experience is always guided in advance, in a field, or modality of unconcealment, implies the difference, but does not yet apprehend it. The difference remained unarticulated in the beginning of the history of Western thinking. "As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws."² The self-withdrawing or concealing tendency in presencing - the epochè - is responsible for the oblivion of the difference, hence for the character of the history of Western thought.³

Metaphysics has been described as the coming of a change in the essence of truth. It is, in fact, the modality of unconcealment eventuated from the beginning in the oblivion of the difference. Declining from the

original insight, into one⁴ realm of presence-beings - metaphysics is the epoch in which being is articulated through 'perfect presence' and 'correct correspondence'; in which presencing into unconcealment holds sway unknown.

Plato stands at the beginning of the epoch of metaphysics, with the change in the essence of truth which institutes the chorismos within presence; but Nietzsche stands at the closure of the epoch,⁵ with the declaration that being, understood as perfect presence, is empty, and that truth, understood as correspondence, is illusion.

Nietzsche's thought addresses itself specifically to the Platonic chorismos, for he intends his work to be an overturning (Umdrehung) of Platonism. If, in the Platonic thought, 'being' as permanent presence is exalted in the Ideas, to the detriment of 'becoming' and 'show', then Nietzsche will deny the 'truth' of the so-called 'real world' of static ideals to which 'becoming' is opposed.⁶ The truth of the 'apparent world' - the only world⁷ - is will to power.

The will is a creative becoming, a self-mastery

which strives to go beyond itself. It is a continual enhancement of power through valuation. Thus it is perspectival;⁸ for evaluation, the conditioning of what-is, must reckon according to its point of view. At the end of metaphysics, the 'ought', by means of which we tend to delimit the sense of being, comes to the fore. The will is "sensuous", "life-enhancing". The creative activity of the will expresses itself most fully in art, for art is the bringing-forth of beings within the world of sensuous becoming and appearing. It is the greatest expression of the will to power. Art is true to the will's becoming.⁹ And 'truth'? Conceived in the ordinary way as the correspondence between subject and object, Nietzsche believes himself to have abolished 'truth' along with the ideal world.¹⁰ For without the permanent, self-evident basis upon which to establish such correspondence, without any supra-worldly guarantee for cognition, no correct correspondence, no universally valid judgments can be established.¹¹ There is only a chaos which strives to direct itself toward shape and meaning in beautiful works of art.¹² We might, indeed, characterize Nietzsche's thinking in the phrase: 'art is true; "truth" is illusion.'¹³ For Nietzsche, there is a

fundamental disjunction between art and truth.

Art is commonly held to be a genus of entities with properties of a special sort, which supply the basic 'thing' with 'aesthetic value'.

It almost appears that the thing-likeness in the work of art is a foundation on which and over which is built something else, something proper. (OWA, p.4).

Truth is ordinarily thought to obtain between a statement and its object; it evaluates the correctness of the subject-object relation.

Agreement with that which is there has long been considered as the essence of truth. (OWA, p.23).

Art and truth do not seem to bear a relation with one another. Yet the thinking which assigns a measure of value is common to them both, and they can enter a 'conflict of values'. With Nietzsche, correctness of representation becomes explicitly the assignation of value - the 'ought'.

Does Nietzsche in fact accomplish a reversal of Platonism? The two-fold (Zwiespalt) of truth and art in Plato's work was, according to Heidegger, a 'friendly' (beglückender) one.¹⁴ Art belonged to truth because it too mirrors the Ideas, after a manner, though on a

considerably lower level than that representing which establishes the correspondence of the 'many' with the 'one', with the Ideas. Art is mimesis, an imaging of the Ideas, but it stands off at a distance (Abstand) from the 'art of truth' (dialectic) which more closely approaches their perfection. In art, the appearance of the Idea is not brought to view as fully as it is through philosophical discourse; art lets the perfection of the outward look (eidos) show itself only partially.¹⁵ The craftsman bodies forth the eidos in a yet more complete fashion; but only in philosophical speech does the Idea direct itself with 'well-rounded' presence.

But the 'harmonious twofold' becomes a 'raging discord' (erregender Zwiespalt) with Nietzsche, primarily because he does away with 'being', conceived as static, permanent presence.¹⁶ The 'truth' of permanence is an illusion. But art is true to the sensuous world. In the excitement (Rausch) of creativity, we can escape the horror of the truth; that there is no world of permanence on which to rely, that 'being' is empty, and at the same time, we can redeem this horror to a certain extent, through works of

art.¹⁷

Nietzsche values art more highly than truth;¹⁸ that is, he holds that while 'truth' in the traditional sense removes from appearance its worth, and deprives it of its creativity, art enhances it. The point not to be missed here, is that Nietzsche's thinking is embedded within a process of evaluation which, he believes, is determinative of the character of whatever is.¹⁹

That evaluation should have become the essential character of being has its roots in the severance of logos from physis.²⁰ In the Idea is retained something of the original meaning of physis, the emerging and appearing presence. The word idea, however, is limited to the 'outward Look', or visible aspect presented by something. Being, stabilized in the idea, now means the appearance of the thing in the apprehensible what of its presence.²¹ Now the vision of the thing is decisive:

Because the actual repository of being is the idea and this is the prototype, all disclosure of being must aim at assimilation to the model, accommodation to idea. The truth of physis, aletheia as the unconcealment that is the essence

of the emerging power, now becomes homoiosis and mimesis, assimilation and accommodation, orientation by..., of apprehension as representation. (IM, pp.184-185).

Formerly, entities had been disclosed in the gathering of logos and its determination of speech. Now speech is engaged in the struggle to maintain correct representation as against semblance and disguise. Because 'show' may offer different aspects, it affords different perspectives to those who form opinions about it. The 'show' was opposed to the 'reality' of the unchanging Ideas by Plato, and became 'mere appearance'. Truth was set apart from such partial views, and the struggle to maintain the pure vision of being against illusion, semblance, disguise, was set in motion.²² Thus, the 'regulating' and 'righting' function which the object provides cognition in correct correspondence, points toward a more profound availability of what is there, for if the object did not first show itself, stand out into unconcealment, how could correspondence emerge?²³ On the basis of the open and its openness everything may stand, may take up a position; hence it may regulate and provide criteria for statements.

Truth came to be embodied primarily in the

statement, which reflects the 'what' of a thing, the 'being as...', or 'in terms of' its properties, magnitude, relation, etc.²⁴ Early in the history of metaphysics, logos became statement and in this form molded apprehension into an evaluative representing in terms of which entities could be judged.²⁵ Hence the correlation between thing-structure and sentence-structure, derives from their common source in physis, as the process of emerging into unconcealment (aletheia).²⁶

Evaluating thought "always starts from something permanent",²⁷ i.e., the standing Idea, and it is in terms of its judgments that both being and its limitations (becoming, show, thinking), are understood.²⁸ It thus prepares the way for 'ought': that which never is, but always 'ought' to be, which has the power to determine, and set a standard for being.²⁹

The idea has a regulatory function. Its purpose is to set the standard by which judgment can measure its correctness; and to provide the paradigms for human making and building. While the highest standards are measure-giving for human activity, they are

nevertheless present in just such a way as to be serviceable for human production. The change in the essence of truth has put man, and that which man values, at the centre of all that is. Apprehension is no longer gathered into the presencing of being through the difference. For early Greek thinkers, man had participated in the bringing-forth of beings into presence. Techne and legein³⁰ expressed man's responsibility in the arrival of beings into presence, from cover. Forthcoming arrival in techne and legein was guided by the unified gathering of being (eon). With the happening of metaphysics, however, man participates in unconcealment in unawareness.³¹

When physis is fragmented into Ideas, a unifying determination of their being is demanded, and the agathon, the good, is thus set beyond being.³² Decisive is the fact that it is apprehension, now transformed as judgment, which determines how it stands with being. The good, as the ultimate governing principle, the conditioning condition, guarantees the likeness between seeing and what is seen, since it makes everything shining, visible, beautiful; and endows beings with the ability to imitate the good. It

is both the measurement by which properties are adjudged true, and life good.³³ Estimation as judgment becomes enthroned as determinative of what-is. Yet man belongs to being out of the origin and always exists in some understanding of being - whether he recognizes it or not. With Plato, man responds to being, understood as Idea, through judgment.

Being is upheld by thinking for which a unifying perspective is necessary: it starts upon the road to becoming the pure conditioning power of evaluating will.

In the "revaluation of all values", Nietzsche does not merely wish to institute new values, but a new standard of valuation;³⁴ rather than the representation of correct statement, it is to be artistic, "life-enhancing" (aesthetic). Yet precisely in this he stays within the metaphysical tradition, for which evaluation is the direct outcome of the dissection of being. Nietzsche affirms sensuous, life-enhancing values, which conform to the ends of the will. Truth is to be serviceable to man. 'Correct correspondence' is the kind of evaluation which Nietzsche denies; the mastery of form in art is a setting of worth which he affirms.

Although he reverses the judgment of Plato on the relative value of life and the ideal, nevertheless he retains estimation and judgment. With the absolute positing of evaluation, he draws out a possibility latent in the agathon of Platonism, and "... a maximum of confusion and uprootedness was achieved."³⁵ For Plato, correspondence of many with the one had made the distance between truth and art a 'friendly' one, but when Nietzsche removes the possibility of correspondence with the destruction of the ideal world, he remains within a thinking which evaluates, thus a metaphysical thinking,³⁶ dominated by the Platonic chorismos within being.

The account of truth and art by both Nietzsche and Plato arises out of an interpretation of the sense of 'show'.³⁷ For Plato the degree of resemblance between the character of a particular entity and the pure outward 'Look' (eidos) determines truth. For Nietzsche, since 'permanence' is an illusion, this kind of true correspondence is not possible; but art is the beautiful illusion which tells the perspectival 'truth' of sensuous appearing. It is the pure self-mastery of will to power. In the course of forgetfulness of the

original nature of 'show', i.e., unconcealment (aletheia), the essence of truth - physis - has become veiled.

The discord between art and truth has its historical ground in the change in the essence of truth by which appearing no longer means the unconcealing forthcoming of being, but rather correctness of vision, with Plato. For Nietzsche, 'appearance' comes to have a greater value than 'truth', i.e., than the truth of correspondence - which is a "lie". We are left in the end with two types of appearance, metaphysically incapable of being grounded or of providing a ground. Originally, truth and show were essentially bound together in physis as the arising and self-showing of being.³⁸ The discord of art and truth is the eventual expression of the severing of 'becoming', 'show', 'thinking', 'ought' from being. Only fragments and reminiscences of what was originally understood in the Greek word 'physis' remain, through the central fact that 'truth' no longer bears any significance. Even art loses its meaning while it remains rootless.

Nietzsche is not able to heal the 'raging discord' of art and truth because he has no way of

bringing the contenders to a ground. He no longer has any way of asking the question of being explicitly, since - for him - 'being' means only the static life-denying realm of ideals. The very urge to ground - the "will to truth" - belongs for Nietzsche to this Platonic idealism.

We said that the traditional conception of the relation between art and truth is metaphysical at its core. We are now in a position to see why and how this is so. Aletheia is inherent in physis; essential to it is the creative bringing-forth which we today call art (techne). That the change in the essence of truth brought about their separation is a radical displacement; they can now collide in the domain opened by the Platonic chorismos.

At the same time, the discord between art and truth lies at the core of metaphysics. The secession of logos from physis, and the accompanying change in the essence of aletheia; in short, the deprivation of physis, and its transformation into idea, "... gave rise to one of the essential movements in the history of the West, and not only of its art."³⁹ It opens the chorismos between the ideal as what is most 'beingful'

(ontos on) and that which is a 'mere copy' of it (me on).⁴⁰ Finally, being in its richest sense - presencing - lay shrouded and forgotten. With this, the ground upon which art and truth stand together is hidden, and metaphysics completes itself through the consummate expression of rootlessness in their discord.

Thus to open the question of the discord between truth and art is both to enter the question of truth in its fundamental relation with being, and at the same time, to return to the ground of metaphysics, at whose inception we find the separation of physis from logos through the change in the essence of aletheia. "The essence of truth is the truth of essence."⁴¹ The failure of truth evidenced in the discord faces us with the exhaustion of being in its metaphysical sense. It calls for a re-thinking of the relation of being and its limitations; and that means, for Heidegger, to raise the question of being and time.

The word 'metaphysics' is used in different ways in Heidegger's writings,⁴² as his interpretation of Western history develops. We are concerned with metaphysics as the history of the oblivion of being, which is initiated with Plato and closed with

Nietzsche.

Plato stands at the beginning of metaphysics with a "change in the essence of truth". This happening brings with it transformations in the modality of presencing which are to characterize the entire history of Western thought, and emerge fully developed in Nietzsche's work. Dominating the historical field of metaphysics, is the mode of presencing in which 1) Man is taken to be central - metaphysics is humanist; 2) time is threatening, and therefore to be vanquished; and 3) being, with its unconcealing trait, is hidden by the very constitution of the metaphysical modality. Metaphysics names a "change in the truth of essence".

The de-construction of metaphysics proceeds by reading forward from Plato the progress of physis as idea; aletheia as correctness, logos as statement; and by reading retrogressively from Nietzsche's denunciation of Platonic truth, the history of the oblivion of being. Nietzsche exposes metaphysics as Platonic, as functioning within the chorismos of 'being and becoming, show, thinking, ought'.

The evaluational, humanist character of

metaphysical thinking is evident in the Platonic initiation, when we read back from Nietzsche to the supremacy of the Platonic Ideas. The Ideas imprinted everything with characters which would make it possible for man to submit things to his mastery. In knowledge, things are rendered present through human judgment; they can be made available through correspondence with paradigms, and thus they can be dominated. Early Greek thinking had had order and method, but it had not the character of evaluation and referring, as in verifiability. Metaphysics, however, is humanist:⁴³ Man claims mastery over what is. The Ideas permit man to occupy the central position in presencing by providing a standard for human acts and judgments, and a goal with which he may identify himself. Heidegger characterizes metaphysics as onto-theo-logy;⁴⁴ since it relies upon human positing of a super-mundane, divine standard through which to regulate his endeavours. And Nietzsche, too, condemns previous thinking for this reason.⁴⁵ Yet Heidegger considers that Nietzsche's thought continues within the humanist tradition, since Nietzsche only wants to abolish the ideal, regulatory standard, the mediator of human valuation, and not evaluation itself. For Nietzsche, the explicit, self-

conscious positing of values as goals would greatly enhance human being; man would become "higher", Übermenschlich. The will to power would become explicit and no longer disguised or hidden behind a divine figure. Evaluating thought represents everything in relation to man, who has held himself throughout the course of metaphysics to be master of what is.

Nietzsche believes himself to have abolished the Platonic world of permanent presence (which he calls 'being') with his conception of will-to-power, and to have established that there is only the world of 'becoming, show, thinking, ought'. The Platonic chorismos is reversed; or better, over-turned.

... as long as the 'above and below' define the formal structure of Platonism, Platonism in its essence perdures.... [A]n overcoming of Platonism ... succeeds only when the 'above' in general is set aside as such ... when the true world - in the sense of the ideal - is expunged.... If the true world collapses, so must the world of appearances.⁴⁶

Heidegger's interpretation of "will to power"⁴⁷ exhibits it as an empty term, for the will can only will to be itself, will its continuance. The will wills in an eternal circle of identity. The supreme will to power is "to stamp becoming with the character of being".⁴⁸ There is no divine, stabilizing figure which

could be taken as 'being', but 'becoming' repeats itself eternally, and is thus characterized by the traits of self-identity, stability and permanence - the traits which since Plato have typified being ('presence').

It has been the issue of metaphysics to show how presence, understood as stability and constancy, could enter into becoming, to stabilize what appears with permanence: Nietzsche's formulation of time as an eternally recurring circle is an attempt to abolish the dichotomy of time and eternity, finite and infinite. The eternal return is intended to give becoming the character of presence, and therefore, value ("meaning").

Eternity, not as a static "now", nor as a sequence of "nows" rolling off into the infinite, but as the "now" that bends back into itself! what is that if not the concealed essence of time? Thinking being, will to power, as eternal return, ... means thinking being as time.⁴⁹

Since the flow of time "as a sequence of 'nows' rolling off into the infinite", would rob existence of value, Nietzsche imposes eternity upon becoming.

The ultimate will to power is to impose

stability upon becoming through eternal return: Will to power is a metaphysical concept.

The expression "will to power" designates the basic character of beings; any being which is, insofar as it is, is will to power.⁵⁰

What-is gets understood as the sum of available objects suitable for human purposes. Nietzsche reveals and expresses this relation in his analysis of nihilism.⁵¹ 'Being', as the supreme being, the "otherworldly" figure and standard of valuation and judgment, has been empty; "God is dead". Being as 'presence' has been exhausted. "Being - a vapour and a fallacy." Hence, although Nietzsche thinks being as will to power, "... thinks and meditates on being, that is, on will to power as eternal recurrence ... [he] does not think it as the question of being and time."⁵² Oblivion of being deepens as man explicitly usurps the role of determining and articulating the order of presence.

For Heidegger, our times are characterized by just such determinations as Nietzsche had discovered. Our world has forgotten being, and is governed by relations of domination. Being, even in the Platonic sense of perfect presence, has been forgotten, and so

comes toward us as 'nothing'.⁵³ The modality of presencing in modern technology is such that all things must become available to man, and conform to his usage.⁵⁴ Eventually everything is rendered present by the willing subject; whatever is in being gains its 'presence' through representation.⁵⁵ Following Nietzsche, the Western world pushes subjectivism to its limit.

Man is exhibited as the self-conscious subject in every representation, who secures everything in his self-knowing. Everything is ordered preliminarily according to the 'idea' or structure of objectness, which corresponds to representing's own order.⁵⁶ Thus 'subjectivism' has 'objectivism' as its necessary counterpart.

What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth. (QCT, pp.129-130).

Whatever is, 'is', not because it is brought-forth into presence, but because it has been set-over-against, objectified in representing.⁵⁷

Aletheia at the end of metaphysics means

conformity of what-is to the overmastering will.

Correctness consists now in the arranging of everything that is to be represented, according to the standard that is posited in the claim to knowledge of the representing res cogitans sive mens (thinking thing or mind). (QCT, p.89).

There is no longer any need of a divine figure through which man's dominion could flow - 'God dies' - and man becomes the 'master' of presence.

The reigning order of unconcealment at the end of the epoch of metaphysics has been characterized as 'Will to Will' - the final step toward human domination over whatever is. The relation between man and what is not human is one of violent conformity - man renders everything present according to his projects. Techné the bringing-forth which lets arrive into unconcealment, has become 'technology', the provoking, setting-upon nature, which imposes⁵⁸ 'goods' into co-sistence⁵⁹ of 'materials-' and 'energy-' under the regulation of the profit-principle.⁶⁰ Everything - including man - is ordered to stand ready-at-hand, for further im-position into stores, into energy, into exchange, into consumption.⁶¹ The unconcealment which reigns through the setting-upon in technology renders

everything present through man's labour.⁶² In the age of technology, man is called upon by profit-making to exploit what-is as something that can be imposed into order by him, for his consumption. Man completes the imposition which unconceals, through his labour; but he does not control the modality of unconcealment itself. "... the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork,..."⁶³

The change in the essence of truth, which informs Plato's thinking, is brought about by a change in the truth of essence, one that conceals itself in such a way, that the happening of being can scarcely be discerned throughout the epoch of metaphysics. The coming of metaphysics brings with it the obscuring of the difference of being and beings so that 'being' becomes a name for the highest being - that which is eternal and unchanging, and which governs transient being. Being, presencing into unconcealment through the difference, is forgotten, and metaphysics seeks to ground what-is in the permanently present. Presencing in the epoch of metaphysics is so constituted that we cannot think of presencing as such, but err around grasping at that which has been unconcealed - entities.

Oblivious to being, we stray in the area of unconcealment and fail to see it. Seeking the ground, we do not find what is first, but only principles and causes. The epoch of metaphysics is characterized by being's having hidden itself in oblivion; by man's having forgotten to attend to being.

Metaphysics is "injurious neglect of the thing".⁶⁴ Everything appears in relation to man's projects, until today we have "the labourer".⁶⁵ Man, committed to being, responds to the provoking-forth⁶⁶ of unconcealment, as profit-making. This challenging "... gathers man into im-posing (Bestellung). This gathering concentrates man upon [imposing] the real as con-sistence (Bestand)."⁶⁷

But man does not yet experience himself as the one who responds to a provoking-forth in the manner of exploitative im-posing; he does not experience the set-up⁶⁸ as such; hence he does not know himself to be gathered into im-posing unconcealing. This, for Heidegger, encompasses the danger of technology, that man should fail to bring-forth (technē) anything, but only set upon what has been unconcealed; and that he should thus fail to encounter his essence as the site

of unconcealment of being.⁶⁹

Since destining at any given time thus starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in [imposing],... Through this the other possibility is blocked, that man might be admitted more and sooner ... to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing. (QCT, p.26).

The set-up (Gestell) is historical destiny, the modality of unconcealment which proceeds out of the original gathering of man in the Greek beginning. If man should fail to heed the set-up as that which claims man in his ek-sistence, there is the threat that man would forget that he is, as the one belonging to being. For being, in the age of technology, conceals its essence as presencing into unconcealment: the set-up recedes, so that we do not see how man is provoked into unconcealing through imposing; it conceals presencing.⁷⁰ But the danger that man may surrender his essence into imposing as the only mode of unconcealment, may harbour within itself the possibility that man's belonging in presencing may become apparent.⁷¹ For this, he needs to become aware that he is claimed in his way-to-be by the essence of

technology.⁷²

... the coming to presence of technology cannot be led into the change of its destining without the cooperation of the coming to presence of man. (QCT39).

Modern technology has no means by which to understand its own constitution, for the essence of technology is hidden, by its character as self-concealing, in oblivion. Technology is "a very human capacity" - but the essence of technology, the ordering sway of our times, is beyond man.

The de-construction of the history of metaphysics aimed at approaching the question of the essence of technology. It is with respect to the background of early Greek thinking that Heidegger is able to define an epoch as metaphysical, and to determine its dominant traits, through the mutual reflection of Nietzsche and Plato. The metaphysical epoch was opened with Plato and closed with Nietzsche; but before Plato, there was thinking of being. Might there not be thinking of being in the age of technology? The recapture of an experience of being, of a way of thinking pre-metaphysical in character, could profoundly clear the way for another thinking of being.

By revealing the way in which metaphysics has governed the Western world, it could be seen how Western man has been claimed in his belonging to being - even in the epoch of technology. To being there might be returned its 'temporal', creative essence. And man might be restored to his way-to-be.

Entities are unconcealed according to the epochal essence in any age. Today, technology reigns throughout unconcealment, and men's labour in production is the response to the prevailing modality. Dasein never escapes the ground of his being even in errancy; for the truth of being is the ground of metaphysics and technology: Man stands in the clearing of being. Though things have been reduced to subjectivity in "injuriously neglect" in the technological world, they may perhaps be more than the reflection of our dominating power, if we can open

... our vision to see that workhood of works, utensilhood of utensils, thinghood of things, all come nearer to us only when we think of being of all entities. (OWA25).

They can be revealed to us through works of art. Through poetry, we may be able to learn to listen to the essence of technology, so that a world for our

belonging could be unconcealed.

Chapter Four

REMEMBRANCE OF BEING

The Origin of the Work of Art re-opens the question of truth in its interconnection with art; thus it involves the de-construction of traditional ontology. For the 'discord' between art and truth lies at the heart of metaphysics, exemplifying the oblivion of being. The problem of the 'discord' between art and truth can be dealt with only by returning to the ground of this tension.

The three traditional thing-interpretations which Heidegger recounts in The Origin of the Work of Art,¹ tell us no more about things than about works. The thing has been viewed as a substance (hypokeimenon) in which inhere its properties (symbebekota); or the aistheton, the unity of the manifold of the sensibly given; or formed matter (hyle and morphe); sometimes combinations of the three interpretations are proposed. Heidegger's criticism of these thing-interpretations is implicitly a criticism of everydayness² whose very obviousness obscures its history. For what seems obvious and natural to us is the result of a definite inquiry and interpretation:

What is "natural" is not "natural" at all, here meaning self-evident for any given ever-existing man. The "natural" is always historical.... there ... must have been a time when the essential definition of the thing was first worked out. (WIT, pp.39-40).

It is Heidegger's aim to overcome the polarization of 'self' and world, to approach the original ground of the correspondence of subject and object, statement and thing, in his "de-construction" of the history of metaphysics.³ This he had already begun in Being and Time. As being-in-the-world, Dasein is always already submitted to a world with which it is intimately involved. That world is historical: everyday understanding emerges out of the development of physis as idea and ousia, aletheia as correctness, logos as statement.

Traditional theories of aesthetics rely upon an interpretation of the thing as hypokeimenon, a 'basis' with the character of 'already-there-ness' before the addition of 'properties'.⁴ The fact that the hypokeimenon still serves as the foundation of our ways of thinking points to the neglect of being in our tradition, for this is an interpretation "saved from the ruins" of the breakdown of unconcealment in the

original sense.⁵ Being has been forgotten, it is no longer questionable, and the discoveries of ancient ontology have simply been assumed and taken for granted as unworthy of further thought.⁶ Thus to Nietzsche, thinking within the domain of 'being against becoming, show, thinking, valuing' - in the domain of the Platonic chorismos - 'being' as permanent presence appeared to be a fallacy, and he remained dominated by metaphysics.⁷

The unconcealment of being in the first beginning concealed its own granting, so that being withdrew from what was unconcealed, and remained forgotten in favour of beings.⁸ In this self-withholding - the epochè - being eventuated the decline of thinking into metaphysics. The epochal withdrawal of being into concealment at once with its move into unconcealment, prevails throughout Western history as its hidden destiny. This destiny endures from Plato to Nietzsche and in the reign of technology: the beginning still prevails in our world. Overcoming technology, surpassing metaphysics, means that the history of being needs to be responded to.

The inquiry into truth in The Origin of the

Work of Art is an original one because it raises the question in its essential sphere. But Heidegger does not start with the question of truth; he starts with the question of the origin of the work of art, and comes through this to the exploration of truth.

The work is not adequately handled by the traditional treatment of it as a 'thing' under the genus 'art'.⁹ In fact, it is not thinghood which reveals to us the nature of the work of art, but the other way around; the work of art tells us about things - the shoes of a peasant, for example.

The work opens entities in their truth, it discovers the being of entities. The work is a "setting-into-work"¹⁰ of truth; it is a happening which lets the being of what is there stand into discoveredness. Art is the setting-into-work of the truth of beings.¹¹

In truth's happening in the work, the uncovering world is exposed and the covering earth is composed.¹² They strive together, provoke each other to an enhanced assertion of their own ways to be. The collecting collectedness (Logos) sets-apart and sets-

forth as a "contentious unity". The strife within truth is striven for unconcealment, for the bringing-forth-out-of-cover of entities. The work provokes and bears their strife; it strives in and with their strife for the clearing; for, inmidst of beings, there is an open place which yields men access to beings and to themselves. This is the possibility for man which is ignored in im-posing assault upon what-is.¹³

The shoes of the peasant in Van Gogh's painting belong to the earth and are protected by the world. In their self-containment, their preservation of a kind of secrecy, we grasp their essence as "reliability".¹⁴ That secrecy is not preserved when the thing is analyzed in terms of conceptual structures; but only when the thing is considered in the contentious unity of world and earth. The clearing is a happening; it opens within covering and refusal of entities. The earth rises into the world as self-closing, and the world as the sphere of existential decisions is grounded upon earth only while truth happens in their striving together.

Through the work, the strife of earth's self-refusal and the order of the peasant's world occurs,

and the reliability of the utensil appears. The truth of being sets itself to work in the work of art; the utensil is gathered into a context of involvements as belonging to earth's silent granting. The strife of world and earth is the struggle for unconcealment within being.

Unconcealment is the original way-to-be (Wesen) of truth; the work is one way, "an exquisite way"¹⁵ in which unconcealment may take place. But what is truth if it may happen as art? How is there art, if it lets happen truth in the work?

In the being-created of a work consists its work-likeness. To bring a work out of cover forth into discoveredness is to let truth happen (techne). The strife for the clearing sets covering and clearing apart, thus opening the region in which the strife may be striven. Truth can remain the openness of what is open only as it directs itself into the clearing within which receptive Dasein must stand. Because truth is the encounter of clearing and covering, it directs itself into the open and what is open there. This directiveness of truth is the tendency toward the work.¹⁶

Through the being which is to be brought-forth, created, the strife of world and earth is to be set-to-work. The striving of world and earth is a breach which is intensified into the simplicity of lines of design in the work. Thus that which is brought forth, the work, bears the mark of their essential strife.¹⁷ The work challenges those who behold it,¹⁸ carries them into the strange openness of what is opened through the work. Beholding which stands open to the enormity brought forward by the work, lets the work work, i.e., lets truth set the strife for unconcealment to work. Man, in his way-to-be stands out into the clearing within primordial strife for unconcealment.

Art is the setting-into-work of truth. In creation, art sets directive truth into design. At the same time, to set-into-work is to let workhood happen. Therefore, "... art is a becoming and happening of truth."¹⁹

The work of art belongs to the unconcealing essence of truth, and, because it works within the world which is opened by speech for existence, it is poetical.²⁰ Speech (Logos) first brings Dasein to the

clearing of being;²¹ that is to say, it is speech which first discloses, brings beings forth into the region of unconcealment for Dasein, and discloses Dasein as 'there', as open in the midst of beings. Naming nominates, pro-nounces beings and calls them forth to be in the open.²² Truth happens in poetizing, the primordial speech which clears, and thus projects the clearing into which beings may enter, each in its own way. In poetizing projection which clears Dasein lets truth work in a work of art. Poetizing originally opens entities to Dasein, and lets them shine from out of the struggle for the clearing in truth. It clears the open place through projecting some understanding of being, within which disclosive Dasein may move. The gathering order of being is articulated in speech, and opens a world for thrown, discovering Dasein.

The opening of openness and the clearing of being happens only when that which has been thrown into openness is projected. (OWA, p.61).

Because Dasein is thrown, and, through poetizing, is projected, it is open to being. Ecstatic existence is primordially disclosive through poetizing. At the same time,

Projection is the enabling of that throw in which

discoveredness enters among beings as such.
(OWA, p.63).

Poetizing is fundamental to disclosure because it particularly opens those possibilities of being toward which Dasein is thrown. Dasein can have been thrown forth by being only if it is projected toward being through some understanding of what being means. It is in this manner that Dasein enters the struggle of clearing and covering.

Art is poetry,²³ and thus a founding of truth in the sense that it uncovers and grounds, and originates by opening a dimension for historical existence.²⁴ Art is the originating origin of a people's destiny in the way that it brings forth entities into the context of their world, shows Dasein in its strangeness, draws it into the happening of truth, that it may know: there is being. Art provokes the strife of truth and sets it to work so that it may continue to bring forth and to ground. It is an origin which originates. In it there is the strangeness of strife against the norm, strife which ever and again springs forth over ahead of what is still to come; the beginning is still coming (future).

The beginning founds by gathering Dasein into

the strife of truth. Thus being brings and stays existence in the clearing, in its ek-statical character through speech. It calls for Dasein's decision to enter the strangeness of strife by discovering, and explicitly taking speech upon itself as endowment, yielding the ground, and beginning.²⁵

History is for a people their move into what is demanded of them through their entry into what is given to them. (OWA, p.66).

Poetry is thus historical.²⁶ It demands of Dasein a responsive turning-toward being and entering the struggle for disclosure, through projectively opening possibilities drawn from that understanding of being which has been granted to it.

Although existence is not characterized in The Origin of the Work of Art in terms of 'care', the elements of thrownness (disposition), projective understanding, and speech are retained. The opening of openness and the discovery of what-is as being happens when Dasein enters its 'there' through speech - speech which is disclosive because it is constituted ecstatically as thrown and projective. Dasein's ek-sistence into the open is temporal. The clearing, the

order of unconcealment, is thus the manner in which being has a bearing²⁷ upon Dasein.

But the clearing is not fixed and permanent,

... the open place in the midst of beings, the clearing, is never a fixed stage with permanently drawn up curtains, on which is played the display of beings. (OWA, p.42).

Unconcealment happens in such a way as to bring temporal existence to its historical world and ground in the ontological dimension opened in the midst of beings. Existence reaches toward the clearing which opens toward it and gathers it into its proper historical sphere. Temporality is thus the manner in which Dasein is committed to being.

For us,... the most readily experienced correspondence to the epochal character of Being is the ecstatic character of Da-sein. The epochal essence of Being lays claim to the ecstatic nature of Da-sein. The ek-sistence of man sustains what is ecstatic and so preserves what is epochal in Being, to whose essence the Da, and thereby Da-sein, belongs. (EGT, p.27).

The interpretation of being as permanent presence is metaphysical, since it dissociates being from that which properly belongs to it: becoming, show, thinking, ought; and indeed disowns being in

forgetfulness of its essence. It arouses the 'discord' between art and truth because it covers over the ground in which they grow together; art and truth only seem discordant from a metaphysical standpoint.

Proper questioning of the problem posed by the discord of art and truth will be historical because it is necessary to return to the origin of the discord, just as to bring truth to its proper ground in being. The successive concealment of being through the history of metaphysics requires that the question of being be posed radically; the discord can only be healed by renewed questioning of being, and within the horizon of time. 'Permanent presence', the metaphysical interpretation of being, arises from an unacknowledged time-determination of being, so as to assure fixity for human calculation; it evolves into a hollow ideal which shatters under the blows of Nietzsche's 'philosophical hammer'. The chorismos cannot be bridged; yet it cannot be ignored. It can only be healed 'from below' as it were, by a thinking of being which comes from the ground up.

The ownmost meaning of being which belongs to the inquiry gives us the assignment of inquiring

into the history of that inquiry
itself, that is, of becoming
historiological. (BT, p.42)

The inquiry which investigates origins is itself
'original' in that it brings forward that which has
been covered-up, or forgotten; it is a thinking which
not only enters the inner direction of history, but
which consigns itself to the movement of that history.

With Nietzsche, metaphysics reveals its inner
character. Rejecting the Platonic evaluation of 'being'
over becoming, show, thinking, 'ought', Nietzsche
declares the Platonic 'presence' empty, "a vapour and
a fallacy", and affirms only the ontological powers
which stand opposed to it. Truth as correct corre-
spondence loses its ground and becomes explicitly
the valuation of whatever serves human purposes.
Nietzsche shows that metaphysics has become empty.
Nihilism, as oblivion of the two-fold of being and
beings, is the essence of metaphysics, which comes to
its realization in the thinking of Nietzsche.
Accordingly, ours is the age of technology, in which
everything must submit to human 'will', i.e., conform
to the imposition of con-sistence (Bestand). Everything
is seen to be unconcealed as a product of labour,
because man is provoked to respond in this way to the

concealed essence of technology, as the prevailing epochal order, for, even in errancy, man is claimed in his way-to-be by being. In this, the withdrawal of being from that which it has unconcealed is extreme: man, who belongs in his essence to the forth-coming of being in unconcealment, is alienated from his way-to-be, so that he does not know, or is not aware, of unconcealment of being. Having forgotten his intimate relation with being, he comports himself in the world in the manner of "injurious neglect of the thing".²⁸ Being as perfect presence, is considered a vapour and a fallacy, while the threat of time is nevertheless ward off by submitting becoming to the sameness of eternal return. The history of being is destined from out of the origin to a concealed governance of human being in the midst of what-is, through the oblivion of the two-fold. The origin comes toward us as a destiny.

Heidegger's thinking is closer to that of the early Greek thinkers than it is to any thinker in the epoch of metaphysics, insofar as the proper belonging-together of man and being remains a possibility for us, as well as the original happening in the history of being. The "step back" to the origin is at once a step

into the essential dimension of our being. That is why Heidegger's analyses of early Greek thinking appear strange and 'unwarranted' to us. They are efforts to 'trans-late' us into an original thinking of being, and they therefore reveal the path of Heidegger's thought, as well as illumining the thinking of Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus in a new way.

Working through the history of metaphysics reveals that the destiny of being in oblivion is one epoch in the history of being, one which was preceded by thinking of being - not as 'presence' - but as response to the gathering within being. Remembrance of being and its history prepares for the surpassing of metaphysics as technology by revealing being as the concealed essence of technology. Metaphysics has no means by which to understand its own constitution, since it arrives in the forgottenness of being! The possibility of understanding and of surpassing metaphysics lies in recollecting its history as one epoch in the history of being, its role as the ontology of presence, and in this way returning to being as the forth-coming of presence in the difference.

Remembrance loosens the ties of absorption into

the world, so that Dasein can be open toward being. It is resolute being-there. Some aspects of 'technology' - the dominance of tools, the imposing upon everything according to man's purposes and usage (praxis), the way in which 'significance' is used for man's project - are reminiscent of Heidegger's description of 'everydayness' in Being and Time.²⁹ In later writings, Heidegger had explored the historical development of metaphysics and everydayness so as to provide a way to overcoming technology. Technology as the prevailing order of our times could not have been conceived as such in Being and Time, for everydayness and inauthentic temporalizing had not yet been understood in their relation to being's withdrawal (epochè). Dysfunction of utensils makes us aware of them in their being, insofar as it disturbs the referential context of the world, drawing our attention explicitly to that context and to the 'presence' of the entity within it; and leads beyond the everyday attitude. Authentic temporalizing, described as "resolute taking action", provided the basis for superseding the technological attitude, as Heidegger develops it in The Origin of the Work of Art and in An Introduction to Metaphysics. There, Heidegger shows how things can come into their

proper ways-to-be when we let them emerge in the ontological difference. Letting-be lets what has been laid down before belong to the unconcealing movement itself, to the 'horizon of existential decision'. Resolve which lets-be is a revolution in the concept of action, since it is a 'non-willing' participation in presencing.

The surpassing of metaphysics involves resolved recollection of things in their being; it ceases neglectful manipulation. Proper comportment toward things lets them be involved in a world into which the silent, self-refusing, yet carrying earth stands; lets the ontological difference show forth in and through them, and safeguards them in unconcealment. Naming lets something be seen in its belonging to the collected collectedness (logos); shows it as emerging into presence, and preserves it with the word. Proper speech - poetizing - keeps beings in their ontological depth, by bringing them forth into the context of significant relations - the world - and disclosing them there.

In the recovery of truth as unconcealment, the ontological powers are restored to being; their proper ground and origin. With unconcealment, metaphysics is returned to its ground. This 'overcoming' of

metaphysics is at the same time the 'overcoming' of the apparent discord between art and truth. Truth is no longer the evaluation of degree of correspondence; it goes to the ground of 'correspondence', to that which permits correspondence. Rather, 'truth happens and is historical'. Unconcealment happens in such a way as to bring temporal existence to its historical world and ground in the ontological dimension opened in the midst of beings. In the inquiry into the essence of truth, being and time are thought together.

Art, the setting-into-work of truth, is the origin of the work, but, "The origin of something is the forth-coming of its essence."³⁰ Unconcealment is the essence of the work, which art originates; and unconcealment is historical. Thus, though he first asks after the origin of the work, Heidegger comes to the point of asking about the work of the origin. Because this is originary, it is not merely something that once happened, and which it is instructive to dig up; it is a happening in which we ourselves are essentially involved. To originate is to bring forth essentially. The truth of the origin is the origin of truth, we might say. That is why, with regard to the question of

being and truth, we find ourselves historically involved, moving toward the Greek beginning.

The Origin of the Work of Art poses the fundamental question of truth in an originary manner; that is to say, it raises the question of truth not only in such a way as to open our vision

... to see that workhood of works, utensilhood of utensils, thinghood of things, all come nearer to us only when we think of being of all entities. (OWA, p.25).

but also in such a way as to recapture the possibility of discovering the ground of the separation of physis and logos, aletheia, legein and techne, as an opening horizon onto the future: remembrance of being asks about being historically; lets what has been come toward us as an origin; lets the origin originate.

Oblivion of being, and the dominance of the will to will are the completion of metaphysics as its destiny. Oblivion, initiated in the Platonic chorismos, culminates in the decline of truth thought metaphysically.

The decline of the truth of beings occurs through the collapse of the world characterized by

metaphysics, and at the same time through the desolation of the earth stemming from metaphysics.

Collapse and desolation find their adequate occurrence in the fact that metaphysical man, the animal rationale, gets fixed as the laboring [sic] animal. (EP, p.86).

Blind to the oblivion of being, man confronts beingness - being as permanent presence - and finds it empty: through the course of metaphysics, being has become 'nothing',³¹ things - "injuriously neglected" - have become consistent (Bestand), world has collapsed - and man has become 'the mass'. Awareness of the danger of oblivion, of alienation from essential belonging together with being, takes place when man turns from everyday concerns and confronts nothing; being as the essence of technology. The danger comes to light as danger in anxiety.

If we are able to become aware of the way in which being gathers us into its unconcealing move - history - we may experience how speech articulates a world and bespeaks human existence there. The relation between word and thing would be able to say how the world and the earth incorporate themselves in the thing. We could "transform our relation to the essence of speech,"³² for it is speech (poetry) which first

opens the clearing within the strife of world and earth as a place of dwelling for mortals. In this way, Dasein could release (Gelassenheit) its hold on beings and acknowledge its belonging to being. It could let beings be involved in a world, and let the world come to them; let entities show themselves in their being. Proper letting-be becomes possible when Dasein's speech becomes 'authentic', or attuned - when it listens to the silent address of that which is to be thought. In this way, if we turn our thought toward being, as being approaches our thinking, oblivion turns into safeguarding, where the presencing of being is preserved by man in its truth.

In the coming to presence of the danger there conceals itself,... the possibility of a turning in which the oblivion belonging to the coming to presence of Being will so turn itself, that, with this turning, the truth of the coming to presence of Being will expressly turn in ... into whatever is. (QCT, p.41).

Safeguarding recollects the truth of being.

Conclusion

THE ISSUE OF BEING AND TIME

We have seen in our discussion of Being and Time how the questions of truth and being turn into each other, for time is the horizon of unconcealment, and disclosure of being takes place through finite being-in-the-world. The question of being and time revolves around the issue of being's disclosure to man. The happening of truth for human existence is historical, for "... the clearing, is never a fixed stage with permanently drawn up curtains, on which is played the display of beings."¹

Being has been understood since the time of Plato as 'presence'. Presence was thought to express the perfection of being, as the fully realized; what 'now' is. Past and future, regarded as the 'no-longer now' and the 'not-yet now', were held to lack presence, and were therefore excluded from 'being'.

Only 'the present', the 'now', was capable of expressing what is available, hence real in the passing of the 'now'-moments and what is eternally - hence perfectly - present always, unchanging, immobile. Plato

states this explicitly:

... the past and future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to eternal being, for we say that it 'was', or 'is', or 'will be', but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly attributed to it, and that 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same forever cannot become older or younger by time, nor can it be said that it came into being in the past, or will come into being in the future, nor is it subject at all to any of those states which affect moving and sensible things and of which generation is the cause.

The sense of being was determined through time as 'presence', and 'eternity' expressed the perfection of presence.

Being was understood to be permanent presence. Presence was also the completeness of being, since permanent presence admits no 'deficiency' of possibility or change. Even for Aristotle, that which is permanently present, is always 'already there' for apprehension. It is the 'underlying down to which' assertions are spoken; it provides the prior conditions for understanding. Eternal being is a prototype and a model which being must reach.

We said that the 'temporal' and 'eternal' were

both time-determinations in the sense of 'the present', and that both were articulated by the 'is'. The sense of being, 'to be', was dominated by the third person singular of the present indicative - 'is'. 'Presence' names being essentially in terms of beings. Eternal beings were considered perfect precisely because they always rest in themselves in unchanging presence. Yet, though time destroys those beings which it encompasses in its 'flowing away', the principle of the unity of beings, was not felt to be threatened by the power of time. 'Substances' disintegrate, change, become different substances - without losing any of their 'presentness'. The principle of undifferentiated identity is maintained throughout metabole in the form of the continuity of presence. By the same token, creation in the sense of a radically new occurrence is impossible in the ontology of perfect presence.

At the end of the epoch of metaphysics, Nietzsche strives to "impress the character of being upon becoming". With these words, Nietzsche points toward time as the proper approach to the question of being, and calls for the imposition of unity and permanence upon the explosive world of creative

becoming. It was 'being' which had provided for the Western tradition, from Plato to Nietzsche, for the wholeness achieved in the self-identity, stability, constancy, fixity of what is. This is the character of presence, because presence was thought in terms of permanent enduring of the self-same. Time also speaks out of being's last name, "Eternal Return of the Same".

The effort to show that being as 'presence' or 'presence-at-hand' is a derivative, historically conditioned understanding of being, led Heidegger to return to the source of Western tradition in early Greece, to recall the original sense of being, and in this way, to prepare the possibility of renewed thinking of being. Early Greek experience of being took place within the two-fold of presencing into unconcealment. Everything present became present, approached unconcealment from concealment, and retreated from presence toward concealment. Absence permeated presence, concealment permeated unconcealment, so that being could be thought as the simultaneous possibility of presence during absence; absence during presence. Being needs man (legein, techne) in its gathering, clearing move, grants to man

'sight' of the unified field of presence and absence. The early Greeks experienced time as the field of unconcealment constituted as flux. Human temporality does not constitute the field of unconcealment, but is itself constituted, ordered ek-statically in response to the two-fold (Brauch, Logos).

Heidegger's analysis of the metaphysical decline, as eventuated in the epoché of being, however, reveals that Dasein does not ultimately carry the responsibility for its disintegration and absorption into the world of its concern. Disintegration has been Dasein's response to the original withdrawal of being from its unconcealment. An order of presence may stick as if it were impermeable to flux, according to Anaximander's showing, if beings no longer 'pay heed' to each other, or to the order of unconcealment. Concealment of the two-fold perpetrates 'inauthentic' temporalizing, stability and persistence.

In Being and Time, Heidegger described the tendency of Dasein to disintegrate and become absorbed in 'one's' idle talk, which relies upon serial temporalizing, what has already been said (rumour), and passing along information without appropriating it

understandingly. This tendency to forget being, is precipitated historically by the epochal withdrawal of being from its granting. Legein, letting-lie-before, as response to what already presents itself, can be overwhelmed by the appearance of what comes forward, by the 'meaning' of what is said, so that it 'forgets' the silent giving of presence. The primordial sense of words becomes lost, gets rigidified into the superficial, because no-one hears or understands the essential saying of the word.

... the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems. (BT, p.262).

Dasein's authenticity in Being and Time, the decision to relate temporally to its ownmost possibility of death in the manner of preparatory resolve, is made possible by heeding the silent call of conscience, which enables Dasein to collect itself out of dispersion into 'one', everyday speaking and understanding, to acknowledge itself as mortal and to grasp itself as a whole. Similarly, the attitude of letting-be attends to, or 'hears', that which silently

addresses thought; "it hears because it understands."³ The silent appeal recalls human being to thinking of being, as the gathering (Logos) of beings into presence. Man lets the being of beings show by releasing them from his constructions or manipulations and toward being.

Metaphysical thought regards presence only as 'the present', but 'listening' thinking understands presence in the more primordial sense of letting-come-to-presence. It can never regard a phenomenon as standing over against a 'subject' as a 'present-at-hand' object. Instead, thinking is a response to the forth-coming of being toward beings. While Dasein lets beings be, releases them into its world, it does not constitute them. That which is to be thought, is in no way originated in acts of consciousness; it gives itself to thought. In letting-be, one experiences one's thought in the 'employ' (Brauch) of things.

Man must surrender his attempt to be the one who brings things to stand, who first lets-lie-before. He can only respond to that which already lies before: speech must first listen. Dasein stands out into the clearing and corresponds to the speech of being which

addresses him there. In this way, the traditional metaphor of light as the guiding illuminating of understanding⁴ finds its source. Logic, as the 'language' which represents a sighted 'correctness' of correspondence between cognition and its objects is discarded by Heidegger in favour of an opening kind of speech which responds to the forth-coming of presence - poetic speech. The clearing (Lichtung) is an opening, which can therefore be lit up.⁵ Being is the giving of the clearing. There is (es gibt) being only so long as Dasein is there: that man needs something to respond to, means that being needs man in unconcealing. This is not to imply any dependency of being upon man - the relation is non-symmetrical. Being does not "need" man in the same sense in which man needs being; yet they belong-together.

Willful subjection of everything to man's ends is completely undermined in responsive letting-be of what comes to presence: man is not the master of presence. This was fundamental to the early Greek experience of being. For them the instantiation of a world was not a human achievement; thought comes as the articulation of presencing. It is necessary to work

through the whole de-construction of Western history to begin to appreciate this strange thought. For it is a revolution in our understanding of human being, that we are not the ordering power of what-is. Working-through the history of metaphysics enables us to relinquish the humanism which puts man at the centre of all that is, and which regards metaphysics itself as a handiwork of man, rather than as the allotment of the history of being.

The essence [Wesen] of truth is the truth of essence. (ET, p.325).

"Essence" (Wesen) does not name some static eternal 'ground' for what-is; it names emergent, presencing (An-wesen) of being. The ideal of conforming correspondence to 'essence' understood as permanent presence is the overcoming of time; in permanence, precisely presencing is lost. But being can be thought as emerging presence through a-letheia, unconcealment. It is the issue of thinking, that presencing happens in the clearing. Heidegger names this belonging-together of being and man 'Ereignis', in which being comes to presence by extending a clearing for man. In the Ereignis there is a granting or allowance of

presence, which includes what remains concealed in the giving. There is, "es gibt" being, and time.⁶ Yet,

If man were not the constant receiver of the gift given by the "It gives presence", if that which is extended in the gift did not reach man, then not only would being remain concealed in the absence of this gift, not only closed off, but man would be excluded from the scope of: It gives being. Man would not be man. (TB, p.12).

The "It gives" extends a clearing to human ek-sistence, and in this way gives time. It brings man into his own (eigen) way-to-be.

Being and time, time and being, name the relation of both issues, the matter at stake which holds both issues toward each other and endures their relation. (TB, p.4).

Not every presencing is a presencing of some present thing. What is no longer and what is not yet - absence - are sometimes more massively 'there' than what presences at present: in anxiety, memory, hope, we may be pre-occupied with no-thing. Past, present and future are reciprocally related, so that each gives and brings about the others. Zeit-Spiel-Raum,⁷ time-play-space names, "... the openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past and present."⁸ The giving which extends, reaches out and unifies the three temporal dimensions in their

interplay, is called the "fourth" time-dimension; "true time". The Ereignis relates and holds toward each other the issues named in "It gives being"; "It gives time".

The giving of being is also a mittance (Schickung), for being withdraws in favour of the gift which It gives, as in the beginning of Western thinking. From then on, being is thought exclusively as being with regard to beings; being is granted as the withdrawal of the It gives into oblivion. The history of being cannot be considered an historiological sequence; it must rather be treated in terms of Ereignis, the transformations of truth.

What is history-like in the history of being is obviously determined by the way in which being [happens].... the way in which It gives Being. (TB, p.8).

The history of being manifests itself as the destiny (Geschick) of the concealment of the giving which holds hidden sway throughout metaphysics.

When Plato represents Being as idea,... when Aristotle represents it as energeia, Kant as position, Hegel as the absolute concept, Nietzsche as the will to power, these are not doctrines advanced by chance, but rather words of Being as answers to a claim which speaks in the [granting] concealing itself, in the "there is, It

gives, Being." Always retained in the withdrawing [mittence], Being is unconcealed for thinking with its epochal abundance of transmutations. (TB, p.9).¹⁰

The giving of being is not, however, a speculatively determinate, 'necessary' process. Still, being transmits itself when it is needed, when something needs to come to expression which had only been implicit before. At the same time, "The epochs overlap each other in their sequence so that the original [mittence] of being as presence is more and more obscured in different ways."¹¹ The historical happenings both reveal and conceal, and only through de-constructing the history of metaphysics, is it possible to show being in its destiny.¹² Although metaphysics did not think or experience the two-fold of being, nevertheless, thinking in the West remains gathered to being, even if that relation is hidden.

The Greek origin remains our destiny. When we try to think being as Ereignis, it is all too easy to represent it as one more metaphysical interpretation of 'being as...' (idea, position, will). Ereignis would then be one kind of being - the one 'given' rather than the giving of being.¹³ The 'ſt' of the 'ſt gives' does not signify a substance as underlying presence - a

hypokeimenon. For the Ereignis is the giving itself. Ereignis 'is' not a being, something which is given; hence 'it' does not 'give' Ereignis. "Ereignis ereignet."¹⁴ "Being vanishes in [Ereignis],"¹⁵ there is gathering unconcealing of being.

We shall call that [granting]-that-gathers (versammelnde Schicken) which first starts man upon a way of revealing, destining (Geschick). It is from out of this destining that the essence of all history (Geschichte) is determined. (QCT, p.24).¹⁶

Ereignis, the pure granting happening of being, perdures throughout history; not in the sense of an underlying ground, but in the sense of a destining giving. Ereignis comes to us in the history of metaphysics.

That which is said before all else by this first source of all the leitmotifs of thinking [aletheia] ... gives voice to a bond that binds all thinking, providing that thinking submits to the call of what must be thought. (TB, p.24).

In remembering being, through the de-construction of the history of metaphysics, we 'step back' into the destining of being, by recollecting ourselves toward that which comes toward us.

For Heidegger, "true time" is the unity of the

three temporal dimensions. Presencing is extended not only in the sense of the immediate presence; what is absent is involved in, and extended to us, along with 'the present'. What has been still concerns and approaches us; so too, what is coming towards us concerns us and offers presence in its approach. The unity of the three time-dimensions, their belonging-together through offering themselves to each other, is what determines each in its own right. The time-play-space which is extended in their unified playing opens up the open dimension in which the approach of what is coming brings about what has been, and, reciprocally, what has been gives what is coming, so that the opening of openness is brought about and given in their mutual self-extending. Presencing occurs in the three time-dimensions as unified, in the con-committance of the approaching three-fold of having-been, presence and possibility.

Nearness (Nähe) is the unity of 'true time': it brings the three dimensions near to each other by holding them apart. Nearness denies to what has been open its approach as the present, and keeps futural approach open 'by withholding the present in the

approach'. Nearness which grants the openness of time-play-space and unifies the mutual offering of the three dimensions, has an element of withholding: "The giving which gives true time [is] an extending which opens and conceals."¹⁷

Being and time, thought together in the Ereignis reveal how being is pluridimensional presencing in the clearing and without the metaphysical vocabulary of Being and Time which had suggested a dependence of the sense of being on Dasein.¹⁸ Being need not be understood, or represented exclusively in terms of 'the present', as permanence. Unconfined from uniform permanence, being involves absence; the granting of our history as destiny, having-been, present, and possibility are held toward each other in 'true time' in a unified way, such that they are experienced as concomitant. The present does not appear as an intermediate 'now', sandwiched between the 'not-yet' and the 'no-longer'; rather, what is coming to be happens as we take leave of what is passing, by gathering it in its de-parture. We have a future by recollecting and releasing the past; we have a past by already engaging in a future. The epochal turns of

being which clear a world for human existence require a de-cisive gathering of past, present and future.

Being reaches man through true time: we are given (cf. geworfen) into a situation to which we must repond, engaging ourselves in what is coming (geschickt) by recollecting what is as having-been (Geschichte). The happening of coming to presence in unconcealment brings-forth: this cannot be understood as entitative, as 'underlying' permanent presence. We must instead think of gathering of beings into their own ways-to-be, of Er-eignis.

Recollection helps the remembrance of the truth of Being by allowing the following to come to mind: The essence of truth is at the same time the truth of essence. (EP, p.75).

In recollection, man, who has been claimed in his essence by being, becomes aware that he has been drawn into the history of being so as to let being come to presence. Recollection in metaphysics brings him to experience the origin as original; as still arriving.

Thus we also never find what is original in the historical retrospect of what is past, but rather only in remembrance which thinks at the same time upon presencing being (what has been in being), and upon the destined truth of being. (EP,

p.75).¹⁹

Recalling how being opens a world for human experience, and lets beings come forward in its light, man can become aware "... that the essence of man is released to the truth of being..."²⁰ and that thinking away belongs already to being.

Being needs man (not in the sense of dependency) for its coming to presence in truth. At the same time, man essentially needs something to respond to. Need of being, is man's need of attunement (Stimme), or response, to that which arrives into presence. In this belonging-together, willing vanishes; man surrenders his claim to be the one who renders present, who determines the what and how of availability. Man may turn toward being in recollection:

The history of being is being itself,... However, since being claims human being for grounding its truth in beings, man is drawn into the history of being, but always only with regard to the manner in which he takes his essence from the relation of being to himself and, in accordance with this relation, loses his essence, neglects it, gives it up, grounds it, or squanders it. (EP, p.82).

In the age of technology, the oblivion of being, the concern with beings to the exclusion of being, becomes

'the danger' because technology as a mode of unconcealment of being, conceals its essence as such.²¹ The oblivion is itself concealed. If the danger is to "come to light as the danger",²² human being must respond to the essence of technology, in order for him properly to dwell "where he stays long". Thinking responds in recollection to the being of beings. Recollection recalls man out of dispersion in entities, to that which claims him in his being. Renouncing self-willing, he "is gathered into his own",²³ as resolute.

In the Ereignis, Heidegger completes the project of Being and Time - to "exhibit being, on the horizon of time" - through his development of truth as the sense of being.

Notes

Introduction

1. BT, p.1.
2. BT, p.1, p.39.
3. BT, pp.22-23.
4. BT, p.42, p.44.
5. BT, pp.39-40.
6. BT, p.39; IM, pp.93-95.
7. IM, pp.93-95.
8. BT, pp.47-48; IM, p.92.
9. IM, p.97.
10. BT, p.39.
11. BT, p.40.
12. BT, p.32, p.35, p.39, p.63.
13. ET, p.322.
14. IM, pp.14-15.
15. IM, p.190.
16. IM, p.36, p.190.
17. Ereignis is sometimes translated "event of appropriation" - a phrase which has the merit of expressing the eigen - "own", "proper" - and the 'becoming which is appropriately one's own' inherent in the German, but it is misleading insofar as it suggests an occurrence in the temporal now-sense. We shall, therefore, not attempt to translate the word, but work toward an understanding of it.

Chapter One

All notes for Chapter One refer to Being and Time, by M. Heidegger, translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (1962: New York, Harper & Row).

1. Where the English translation has used "meaning" we have substituted 'sense' as a closer rendition of German Sinn; we believe that 'sense' suggests the existential import of the German, while 'meaning' is more limited. We have omitted capitals on "being" throughout.
2. BT, p.39.
3. Ibid.
4. BT, p.47.
5. BT, p.44.
6. We have eliminated the translator's capitalization of "being" throughout this text.
7. BT, p.40.
8. BT, p.63.
9. BT, p.64.
10. BT, p.32.
11. BT, p.23, p.25, p.28, etc.
12. BT, p.65.
13. BT, p.161.
14. BT, p.177.
15. BT, p.171.
16. Verfallenheit admits of no precise English translation, but it is hoped that

"disintegration" suggests the dispersal or 'loss' of self into which everyday Dasein 'falls'.

17. BT, p.183.

18. "With the disclosedness of the 'there', this sight is existentially; and Dasein is this sight equiprimordially in each of those basic ways of its being which we have already noted: as the circumspection (Umsicht) of concern, as the considerateness (Rücksicht) of solicitude, and as that sight which is directed upon Being as such, for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is. The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence we call 'transparency' (Durchsichtigkeit)."

(BT, p.186).

19. BT, pp.214-217.

20. BT, p.206.

21. The English translation has "potentiality-for-Being", which we reject, because "potentiality" would leave the suggestion of choice to be or not to be its self, which is there for every Dasein.

22. BT, pp.211-214.

23. 'One' emends the English translation's "they" for the German "das Man"; and "disposition", "state-of-mind", since German "Befindlichkeit" is neither a 'state', nor expressly associated with 'mind'; but means, rather, 'how one finds oneself'. We have rejected the text's "behold" for the German Anschauung, and have used the usual translation of "intuition" here and throughout.

24. BT, pp.217-219.

25. BT, p.233.

26. BT, p.231.

27. BT, p.232.

28. BT, p.236.

29. BT, p.273.

30. BT, p.30.

31. BT, p.244.
32. Ibid.
33. BT, p.63.
34. BT, pp.304-311.
35. BT, pp.312-348, p.385.
36. The German "Schuld" is here translated as "owing" rather than as 'guilt', as Robinson & Macquarrie have it, since Heidegger stresses the unfinished character of such a transaction, the fact that it is not yet complete.
37. BT, p.373, p.390.
38. BT, pp.374-375.
39. BT, p.377.
40. BT, p.376, etc.
41. BT, pp.383-423.
42. BT, p.404, pp.408-411.
43. BT, p.425.
44. BT, pp.426-427.
45. BT, p.426, p.435, p.437.
46. BT, pp.432-433.
47. BT, p.438.
48. BT, pp. 436-437.
49. BT, p.376; pp.373-374.
50. BT, pp.387-388.
51. BT, pp.378-379.
52. BT, p.399. We have removed the translator's capital on "present".

53. BT, p.386, p.388, p.417.
54. BT, pp.458-472.
55. BT, pp.472-480.
56. BT, p.473.
57. BT, p.475.
58. BT, pp.47-48.
59. See pages 9-10, above.
60. BT, p.19, p.39, p.40, p.44.
61. BT, p.32.
62. BT, p.228.
63. BT, p.62, p.228, p.256, p.272, p.364, p.400, p.408.
64. BT, p.257.
65. BT, pp.257-258.
66. BT, p.67.
67. BT, p.128.
68. BT, p.129.
69. *loc. cit.*
70. BT, p.414.
71. BT, p.133, p.245, etc.
72. The English translation capitalizes "self".
73. BT, p.170, p.252, etc.
74. BT, p.170.
75. BT, pp.258-259.
76. BT, p.261.

77. BT, p.263.

78. BT, p.265.

79. BT, p.269.

80. BT, p.400.

81. BT, p.269.

82. BT, p.268.

83. BT, p.27, p.23.

Chapter Two

1. IM, p.102.

physis "... denotes self-blossoming emergence ... opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and perseveres and endures in it,... [to] emerge and linger on." (IM, p.14). It primordially names 'being' for early Greek thinkers, as the elemental or overpowering power which emerges, shows itself and brings itself to stand in beings (IM, pp.63-64).

a-letheia means emergent, self-manifesting. For Heidegger, the 'a-' privative denotes the arising and showing from what remains hidden ('lethe') (EGT, p.26), and man's participation in this process is dis-closive, 'violently' wresting being forth to stand in beings (IM, pp.157-161, pp.168-169, 61-62, etc.; BT, p.265).

eon (the archaic form of 'on', 'being') can be understood within the meaning of physis, but it emphasizes the difference of being (eon) and beings (eonta), since it is the participle of the verb einai, 'to be' (EGT, p.32). The two-fold designated with the participle is "presencing", "... the riddle of Being." (EGT, p.33), which "calls thought to presence" (EGT, p.88).

2. EGT, p.55.

3. IM, p.102.

4. Heidegger accepts as Anaximander's original words only part of the text handed down from Simplicius (EGT, p.29):

κατὰ τὸ χρεών; δίδοναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ
τίσιν ἑλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας.

The traditional translations of this fragment differ only in superficial respects from,

... according to necessity; for they pay one

another recompense and penalty for their injustice.

(cited EGT, p.29, from Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy; fourth ed.; London: Black, 1930, p.52, n.6.).

Heidegger's interpretation of the early Greeks intentionally 'trans-lates' their thought into his own idiom. In doing this, he feels he expresses what remained implicit but "unsaid" in their writings, and compels his reader to make an approach to the issue which concerned early Greek thinkers. Hence his writings are both a reconstruction in their way, of the Greek world, and an elaboration of the matter of his own thinking. Heidegger's translation of Anaximander's words is, therefore, quite exceptional:

... along the lines of need; for they let order and thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder. (EGT, p.57).

The Krell-Capuzzi translation has, "... along the lines of usage;...", but it is contrary to Heidegger's intent to translate "Brauch" as "use", since he wants to avoid concepts such as 'manipulation', which would 'relate' man to being in an improper way (see above, pp.57-59).

5. 'Wahrheit ist Unwahrheit' (ET), in the sense that truth can never be given absolutely to man (see above, pp.40-41).
6. EGT, p.34.
7. EGT, p.33 (The Iliad, Book I, lines 68-72).
8. EGT, p.34.
9. See above, pp.22-26.
10. EGT, p.37.
11. EGT, pp.34-35, p.40.

12. The Gegenwart (present) is a Warten gegen die Zukunft, waiting to-ward the future, which suggests the ekstastic temporality of Dasein, which, as the site of unconcealment of being, "temporalizes primarily from the future" (see notes 15 and 16 below).
13. EGT, p.34.
14. EGT, p.35, p.38.
15. German war ("was"), Heidegger tells us, is etymologically related to the German "wahr". Hence: wahrnehmen (to perceive); verwahren and gewahren (to be aware of; to preserve), and Wahrheit (truth) must be thought as wahren - "... a securing which clears and gathers." The words themselves, Heidegger suggests, bespeak truth as preservation (Wahrnis) of being, from the clearing or site (Wahr) of being, and recall his initial analysis of Da-sein as 'care' (EGT, p.36).
16. EGT, p.34 (and see note 1 above). "Gegen-" has originally the sense of 'with' (bei), (see BT, pp.79-80). It designates, according to Heidegger, that 'toward' or 'in' which presence occurs; the site or Gegend of unconcealment (Da; c.f., notes 12 and 15 above). Hence, the Greeks referred to pareonta, paron; "... coming alongside in unconcealment." (see p.9, above).
17. EGT, p.34.
18. EGT, p.38; cf. IM, pp.21-22, pp.159-160; and see note 23 below.
19. See above, p.16, p.36, p.38.
20. EGT, p.36. The translation "clearing", for the German "Lichtung" is, we suggest, better than "lighting", as it is used in the English translations in EGT, because it conveys the sense of 'lightening', 'opening', which Heidegger says, is more fundamental than the light which can afterwards penetrate a cleared site (TB, p.5).
21. Mnemosune (EGT, p.36), is mother of the muses.

Heidegger emphasizes, in this reference to human creativity, the importance of "having seen", "memory of being" (Andenken; see note 44 below), "response" to that which "has already been laid before" (Logos) into presence (below, pp.55-56). This enhances what he had said about Dasein's authentic happening as a creative responding to inherited possibilities (esp. BT, pp. 434-439). Similarly in IM: The primal, creative contention within being, "... projects and develops what had hitherto been unheard of, unsaid and unthought. The [contending] is then sustained by the creators, poets, thinkers, statesmen.... in their work they capture the world thus opened up." (IM, p.62). Man participates in presencing into unconcealment, but he does not initiate or constitute that process (see note 22, below).

22. Technè (IM, pp.21-22, pp.158-165, p.170). Heidegger has transposed 'men's' powers - speech, thinking, knowing, seeing, and even 'building' to being. Though these powers are constitutive of man, they are not understood here as 'structural constituents' 'belonging' to man; "How could man ever have invented the power which pervades him, which alone enables him to be a man?" (IM, p.156). Instead, "The violence of poetic speech, of thinking projection, of building configuration ... is not a function of faculties that man has, but a taming and ordering of powers by virtue of which [entities] opens up as such when man moves into it." (IM, p.157). Technè, then, is the knowledge ('sight') which enables man to bring being to stand and show in works (art) (IM, p.159). Through knowledge, technè "... wrests being from concealment into the manifest in beings." (IM, p.160). Man does not invent, but he creatively participates in unconcealment. He is resolved ('willing'); but he does not 'will' (mastery) (see below, p.116 ff.).
23. EGT, p.48 ff. Chreon, χρεών, translated "necessity" in Burnet (see above, note 4). For Heidegger (EGT, p.53), χρεών - involvement - from which chreon is derived - suggests ἡ χεῖρ (hand). Hence it names a handing-over, delivering, or giving, which yet keeps and preserves. Heidegger translates chreon, accordingly, with the German Brauch - need, use - keeping in mind the root-

meaning "to brook" (bruchen): "... to be pleased with something, and so to have it in use." (fruchten; to enjoy it).

24. See note 23, above.

25. The hiatus in our citation is the phrase διδόναι ... αὐτῇ δίκην ... τῆς ἀδικίας, which everything after the break translates (see note 4 above). Disjunction, adikias, does not rule what is present; instead, beings "give" (didonai), or accede to, the order of the while (Dike). They surmount disorder, persistence (adikias) in "... letting their essence as presencing belong to order." (EGT, p.44).

26. See note 25, above. Tisis (τίσις) is translated, not as "penalty", but as "esteeming"; hence "heeding". The Fragment thus says, that beings are "considerate" toward one another (allelois, ἀλλήλοις) in letting δίκην) Dike, "order" pervade the while. 'Order', therefore, enjoins "considerateness", "reck", to prevail among beings, so that they "let order belong", each becoming present to the others. EGT, pp.45-47.

27. EGT, pp.47-49.

28. See note 4, above.

29. Cf. EGT, pp.119-120; IM, p.139; BT, pp.269-270.

30. EGT, p.26. We have omitted the translators' capitals on "being" here, and throughout.

31. EGT, pp.50-51.

32. EGT, pp.26-27.

33. See IM, pp.62-63, and, "When Being keeps to itself in its destining, world suddenly and unexpectedly comes to pass." (EGT, p.27).

34. IM, pp.127-128: "It is said that 1) permanence and endurance are characteristic of the logos; 2) it is togetherness [of what is], the togetherness of all [beings], that which gathers; 3) everything that happens, i.e. that comes into being, stands there in accordance with this

permanent togetherness; this is the dominant power."

35. EGT, p.66, p.71, p.75.

36. EGT, p.64; IM, p.132.

37. EGT, pp.65-66; IM, pp.130-132.

38. EGT, p.67.

39. EGT, p.66. (But this is not to suggest that the relation is a symmetrical one; see pp.58-59, below.)

40. EGT, p.75; IM, p.170, p.174.

41. IM, pp.21-22, p.159; and cf. p.156. See note 22, above.

42. Parmenides, Fragment 6, (IM, pp.140-141): Chre to legein te noein t'eon emmenai. Heidegger translates this,

Both are needful, the legein as well as the apprehension - [entities] in [their] being. (IM, p.141);

and,

Needful is the gathering setting-forth as well as the apprehension! [entities in their] being!" (IM, p.111).

The translation from The Presocratic Philosophers; (Kirk and Raven, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1957), p.270, n.345, reads, "That which can be spoken and thought needs must be;" see also, EGT, p.88 ff.

43. IM, p.136.

44. Parmenides, Fragment 5, (IM, p.136): to gar auto noein estin te kai einai; translated, "Thinking and being are the same." (*ibid.*), that is, for Heidegger, "... being and thinking in a

[striving] sense are one, i.e., the same in the sense of belonging-together." (IM, p.139).

Fragment 8, 1.34 (IM, p.139): Tauton d'esti noein te kai houneken esti noema. Taking Fragments 5 and 8 together, Heidegger translates this, "The same is apprehension and that for the sake of which apprehension occurs." Thus, "Apprehension occurs for the sake of being. There is being only when there is [es gibt] [showing], entering into unconcealment, when unconcealment occurs, when there is disclosure.... To [physis] belongs apprehension, which shares in its power." (IM, p.139). We have changed the translations' "appearing" for "showing", as the latter avoids the contrast of 'appearance and reality' which is not at all the context of Heidegger's discussion. He is using the word "Schein", not "Erscheinung".

Kirk and Raven (see note 42, above), give the translation for 1.34 of Fragment 8 (p.277, n.352) as follows: "What can be thought is only the thought that it is. (... [i.e.:] the only thing that exists for thinking is the thought that it is.)".

45. "[Strife (Auseinandersetzung)] does not split, much less destroy unity. It constitutes unity, it is a binding-together, logos. Polemos and logos are the same." (IM, p.62).
46. EGT, p.89-91.
47. EGT, p.91.
48. IM, p.141.
49. IM, p.139.
50. IM, p.170.
51. EGT, p.27.
52. See BT, pp.70-71.
53. IM, pp.114-115.
54. IM, pp.115-119.
55. IM, pp.119-124.

56. IM, p.92.

57. "We understand [our] task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy [de-construct] the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being - the ways which have guided us ever since. (BT, p.44).

58. IM, p.183.

59. IM, pp.180-183.

60. IM, p.184.

61. IM, pp.184-185.

62. IM, p.182.

63. See above, note 52, and pp.27-30, pp.35-36; and IM, p.181, pp.194-195.

64. IM, p.182.

65. IM, p.182.

66. IM, p.184.

67. IM, p.185.

68. IM, pp.186-187, pp.193-196.

69. IM, pp.185-186.

70. IM, p.187.

71. IM, p.186.

72. IM, p.187.

73. IM, pp.186-188.

74. IM, p.187.

75. IM, p.188.

76. IM, pp.190-192.

77. IM, p.192.
78. IM, p.190.
79. IM, p.193; see IM, p.206; EGT, p.38.
80. IM, p.194; see also p.13.
81. IM, p.194 ff., p.202.
82. IM, p.178, p.204; EGT, pp.50-51, 57.
83. IM, p.202.
84. IM, pp.202-203.
85. IM, p.195 ff.
86. EGT, p.51, etc. Heidegger does not use the expression "happening of metaphysics" in IM (where he interprets meta-physics as transcendence of beings toward being, properly understood. The equation of 'metaphysics' with the 'decline' comes later in his thinking. (See below, especially Chapter Three.) However, since in our view the later elaboration of the happening of metaphysics is a development of work begun in IM, we believe that it is not inappropriate to use this expression in discussing the earlier writing.
87. See above, pp.22-26.
88. IM, pp.190-194, p.201, and see p.92.
89. IM, p.204; see p.44, p.194, etc.
90. IM, p.44, 84, 205.

Chapter Three

1. EGT, p.50.
2. EGT, p.26.
3. EGT, p.39, p.50; see above, pp.54-55, pp.75-76.
4. See above, pp.63-64.
5. EGT, pp.25-27. Although we refer to the 'epoch' of metaphysics, there have been many modalities of unconcealment since Plato, or, from the perspective of the de-construction, many successive layers of cover, concealing the original experience of being. However, we consider that metaphysics admits of a unified treatment, since it maintains 'permanent presence', oblivion of being, and humanism throughout, and since the "dialogue" which Heidegger initiates between Plato and Nietzsche illuminates metaphysics as such a unified field of unconcealment.
6. N.I, pp.187-188.
7. N.I, p.188, pp.239-240.
8. N.I, p.245, p.247, p.249.
9. N.I, p.85, #3, p.86, p.143, p.154, p.165, p.251.
10. N.I, p.88, p.89, p.145, pp.239-240.
11. N.I, p.188, p.201, p.247; cf. p.176, 251, pp.513-515, p.617, pp.620-622, p.623.
12. N.I, pp.140-143, p.148.
13. N.I, pp. 38-39.
14. N.I, p.230.
15. N.I, pp.213-215.
16. N.I, pp.187-188, 201, 241-242, 246, 465.
17. N.I, p.89.

18. N.I, pp.86-87, 89, 165.
19. N.I, pp.40-42.
20. IM, pp.189-190.
21. IM, 180-181.
22. IM, p.192, p.193; see p.105, p.109; see above, p.69.
23. OWA, p.40; BT, p.263; ET, p.322.
24. IM, p.187.
25. IM, pp.187-189; and see OWA, pp.8-9:

A simple statement consists of a subject,... "hypokeimenon", and a predicate in which are stated the features of the thing.... we have to ask: does the structure of a simple statement (correlating subject and predicate) truly reflect the structure of a thing (unifying substance with accidents)?

26. IM, p.190.
27. IM, p.195.
28. IM, pp.195-196.
29. IM, p.197.
30. QCT, pp.8-10; see Chapter Two notes, n.21 and n.22, above.
31. See pp.98-100, below.
32. IM, p.196.
33. See pp.69-70 above.
34. N.I, p.40, p.242.
35. IM, p.198.
36. IM, p.199; N.I, p.42, pp.232-233; cf. p.176.

37. N.I, p.249, p.250.
38. IM, p.105, p.109.
39. IM, p.185.
40. IM, p.184.
41. ET, p.322.
42. In IM, or WIM, "metaphysics" has the sense of 'transcending'; going beyond entities toward being (to meta physika), hence acknowledging the ontological difference. "Metaphysics" is meant elsewhere as thinking the epochal history of being in the modalities of presencing (e.g., EP).
43. Humanismusbrief, pp.63-64.
44. ID, in "The onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics"; EGT, p.50, etc.
45. Twilight of the Idols, (trans.) Hollingdale, (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1968); "How the real world at last became a Myth: History of an Error", pp.40-77; and see N.I, K.24.
46. Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. I, (trans.) Krell, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), p.201.
47. QCT, pp.77-81.
48. Will to Power, p.617; and see EGT, p.22; N.I, p.9.
49. Nietzsche, Vol. I, (trans.) Krell, p.20. I have omitted the translator's capitals on 'time' and on 'being' throughout.
50. Nietzsche, Vol. I, (trans.) Krell, p.18.
51. QCT, pp.53-112: "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'".
52. Nietzsche, Vol. I, (trans.) Krell, p.20.
53. QCT, pp.110-111.
54. QCT, pp.14-17.

55. QCT, p.88, p.134.

56. Heidegger discusses "the mathematical" throughout his writings. This is the "orientation in terms of presence-at-hand" mentioned above (p.18); the calculation of everything according to the projection of a model of presence, as is required by modern science. (See, What is a Thing?, particularly p.92.) Calculative thinking is representation and evaluation; hence, "willful" at its core. This latter is the possibility latent within 'judgment' which Nietzsche develops. QCT, p.88, p.142; EP, pp.92-93.

57. See QCT, pp.150-153, pp.92-93, p.100, and pp.152-153:

In the planetary imperialism of technologically organized man, the subjectivism of man attains its acme, from which point it will descend to the level of organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself. This uniformity becomes the surest instrument of total, i.e., technological, rule over the earth. The modern freedom of subjectivity vanishes totally in the objectivity commensurate with it.

58. Bestellen (QCT, pp.12-14). "Impose" preserves the relation with 'compose' and 'expose', which for Heidegger characterize the happening of truth (see below, pp. 106-107).

59. Bestand (translated in QCT as "standing-reserve").

60. QCT, p.18.

61. QCT, pp.17-18.

62. QCT, p.19. 'Labour' translates Arbeit, "Work", German "wirken", meant originally (QCT, p.160) "to bring hither and forth", hence, "presencing". Only later, according to Heidegger, does it come to mean exclusively human activity. Because wirken meant "forth-coming", it came to mean "Wirklichkeit" - "that which, brought forth hither into presencing, lies before;" (QCT,

p.160). Its root is the same as that of the Greek ergon: "... that something comes to stand and to lie in unconcealment." (See EGT, p.56). The words take us back to the realm of presencing into unconcealment: physis and legein, noein and techne.

63. QCT, p.18.

64. QCT, pp.48-49.

65. See Heidegger, The Question of Being.

66. Herausfordern.

67. QCT, p.19.

68. "Set-up" translates Ge-stell, since it retains the sense of the German (while "Enframing" does not), in its interplay with "im-pose" and "consistence".

69. QCT, pp.36-37.

70. QCT, p.43.

71. QCT, p.39, p.43.

72. QCT, p.39, pp.43-44.

Chapter Four

1. OWA, pp.7-14.
2. See pp.37-41, above. Heidegger's criticism extends explicitly to the "natural attitude" adumbrated by Husserl.
3. OWA, pp.7-10.
4. IM, p.187, p.193.
5. IM, p.190.
6. BT, p.2.
7. N.I, pp.174-175; IM, p.199; EP, p.92.
8. EGT, p.27.
9. OWA, pp.11-14.
10. See Chapter Three, n.62, above.
11. OWA, p.23.
12. OWA, pp.36-37; and see IM, p.62 (quoted above, Chapter Two, n.45).
13. OWA, pp.20-22.
14. OWA, p.27.
15. OWA, pp.50-51.
16. OWA, pp.52-53.
17. OWA, pp.56-58.
18. Here "behold" translates "Bewahrung" (see Chapter Two, n.15, above).
19. OWA, p.61.
20. OWA pp.62-64.
21. OWA, p.62, p.63; PLT, p.218.

22. OWA, p.63; IM, p.173.
23. OWA, p.65.
24. OWA, pp.64-65.
25. OWA, pp.64-65.
26. OWA, pp.66-67.
27. See "Martin Heidegger and Man's Way to be", Z. Adamczewski, Man and World, I, (1968), p.375ff.
28. QCT, pp.48-49.
29. See above, pp.3-4, pp.12-14.
30. OWA, p.1.
31. See above, p.95; QCT, pp.110-111; EGT, p.25.
32. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 3rd Ed., (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), p.xxii. We have not followed Richardson's translation of Sprache as "language", but have substitute 'speech', a word which does not primarily suggest vocalization or 'linguistics' (language 'theory').

Conclusion

1. OWA, p.42
2. Plato, Timaeus, 37e-38.
3. BT, p.206.
4. See pp.14-15 above.
5. TB, p.5.
6. TB, p.14.
7. Although TB refers only to "time-space", this designation appears preferable as suggesting the elements of spontaneity and involvement.
8. TB, p.9.
9. The translator's use of "takes place" is unfortunate in suggesting an occurrence 'in time', and we have used "happens" to imply, instead, that which 'befalls', 'comes', as time or being itself.
10. The use of "sending" by the translators has been rejected in favour of 'granting' and 'mittence', which have the sense of a giving which at the same time retains (see above, Chapter Two, n.23).
11. TB, p.9.
12. TB, p.21.
13. TB, p.22.
14. TB, p.24.
15. TB, p.22.
16. See EGT, p.26.
17. TB, p.16.
18. See above, pp.31-32.
19. The translators capitalize "original".

20. EP, p.76.

21. QCT, p.37.

22. QCT, pp.42-44.

23. QCT, p.47.

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